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Abstract

Both medical and legal commentators contend that there is little legal risk for administering life-sustaining
treatment without consent. In this Article, I argue that this perception is inaccurate. First, it is based on an
outdated data set, primarily damages cases from the 1990s. More recent plaintiffs have been comparatively
more successful in establishing civil liability. Second, the published assessments focus on too-limited data set.
Even if the reviewed cases were not outdated, a focus limited to civil liability would still be too narrow. Legal
sanctions have also included licensure discipline and other administrative sanctions. In short, the legal risks of
providing unwanted life-sustaining treatment are not as rare, meager, and inconsequential as often depicted. In
fact, sanctions for administering unwanted treatment are significant and growing.
The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been established for decades. But, as with many principles in
bioethics, like the related doctrine of informed consent, there remains a wide chasm between legal and ethical
principles, on the one hand, and the reality of clinical practice, on the other. In contrast to other
commentators, I have aimed to establish that the prospect for enforcement and protection of patient rights is
not as dismal as commentators often depict. In fact, both private litigants and government regulators have
been imposing sanctions that are increasingly severe and frequent.
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Introduction
New York physician Mahmood Yoonessi, a specialist in gynecologic oncology,'

performed an "extensive surgical procedure" on a 67-year-old patient with advanced
ovarian cancer. 2

Unfortunately, the patient developed problems post-operatively

necessitating blood transfusions, and lost decision-making capacity. 3

The patient's

family was then empowered to make treatment decisions on the patient's behalf. 4 They
soon determined that "enough was enough."5

So, they authorized the entry of a Do

Not Attempt Resuscitation order ("DNR") and directed that the patient receive no
6
further transfusions.
But Dr. Yoonessi rejected these instructions, because he "wanted to further
aggressively treat the patient."' 7
ordered blood anyway. 8

He said, "I don't care what the family wants," and

Furthermore, Dr. Yoonessi told the family that "they were

being like Jack Kevorkian, that if this was his mother he wouldn't allow this to happen,
and that they were playing God by not allowing their mother to have further
treatment." 9 Dr. Yoonessi, in short, deliberately disregarded the wishes of the patient
and her authorized surrogates.
This sort of scenario plays out far too often across the United States. It has
been nearly 100 years since Judge Cardozo's famous and oft-quoted statement of
individual self-determination: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a [physician] who
performs [an intervention] without his patient's consent.

. .

is liable in damages."' 10 But

over the past century, this principle of patient autonomy has, unfortunately, been
honored more in word than in deed.
On the one hand, U.S. courts and legislatures have developed a substantial body

1 In re Yoonessi, N.Y. Bd. Prof. Med. Conduct, N.Y. Dep't Health, No. BPMC 02-188, 2002 WL
33840948 (N.Y.B.P.M.C. June 5, 2002).
2 Id. at *15.
3 Id. at *16.
4 Id.
SId.
6 Yoonessi, 2002 WL 33840948, at *16.
7 Id.
8
Id. at *18.
9 Id. at *16.
10 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogatedbj Bing v. Thunig,
143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
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of informed consent and other patients' rights jurisprudence. On the other hand,
clinical practice has not evolved nearly as far, nor as quickly, as the law. "However
clean, neat, and legal the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment may seem on paper, it is
not always so clean, neat, and practical inside a hospital room."'1 "There is a significant
difference between the black letter law of patients' rights and the actual practice within
the hospital setting."12
A major explanation for the persistent gap between medical-legal principle and
the reality of medical practice is ignorance and misunderstanding of the law. In the
clinical setting "myths about the law often overshadow reality."' 13 "The most efficacious
social facts in the actual hospital situation are [provider] perceptions themselves, not the
14
objective risks."
Often, clinicians' perceptions are that legal risks are far greater than they actually
are. This is the cause of much defensive medicine.' 5 This is particularly true with
respect to end-of-life care. 16 In contrast to this generalization, with respect to
administering life-sustaining treatment without consent, the perception is that the legal
17
risks are lower than they actually are.

Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providersfor Saving Lives, 20 J. LEG. MED. 1, 4 (1999); see
also Phillip G. Peters, The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the
Wrongful Lfe Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673, 674 (1998). "[A]s a matter of legal doctrine, a
patient's right to refuse life-sustaining care is virtually absolute. In hospital wards, however, that
right is often illusory." Id.; John Donohue, Wrongul Living: Recovey for a Physidan'sInfringement on
an Individual's Right to Die, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 391, 419 (1998). "Barring a
dramatic shift in judicial sentiment, the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment ... will remain
a right in name only without any significant remedy at law." Id.
12 M. Rose Gasner, FinancialPenaliesfor Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST.
"

Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 519 (1992).
13 Bethany

Spielman, Bargainingabout Fulility, 23J. L. MED. & ETHICS 136, 137 (1995).

14 Stephen Toulmin, Institutions and their Moral Constraints, in INTEGRITY IN HEALTH CARE
FOR TEACHING, INQUIRY, AND HEALING 21, 26
(Ruth E. Bulger & Stanley J. Reiser eds., 1990); see also Alan Meisel, The Role of Ltigation in End of
Life Care: A Reappraisal,HASTINGS CENTER REP. S47, S48 (Nov.-Dec. 2005); Mark A. Hall, The
Defensive Effect of Medical PracticePolicies in Mapracice itgation, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 119,
119 (1991). "[To the extent that a crisis is in fact widely perceived, it has the quality of a selffulfilling prophesy .. " Id.
15 See Thaddeus M. Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunioy, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121,
121 (2012).
16 See Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life: Getting Beyond the Lim'its
of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL. 143, 171-73 (2007).
17 See infra Sections IV-V.
INSTITUTIONS: HUMANE ENVIRONMENTS
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In this Article, I argue that this perception is inaccurate. First, it is based on an
outdated data set, primarily damages cases from the 1990s. More recent plaintiffs have
been comparatively more successful in establishing civil liability. Second, the published
assessments focus on a highly limited data set. Even if the reviewed cases were not
outdated, a focus limited to civil liability would still be too narrow. Legal sanctions have
also included licensure discipline and other administrative sanctions. In short, the legal
risks of providing unwanted life-sustaining treatment are not as rare, meager, and
inconsequential as often depicted. In fact, sanctions for administering unwanted
treatment are significant and growing.
In Section II, I quickly summarize the now well-established legal bases for the
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In Section III, I demonstrate that clinicians
regularly breach their duty to respect patients' right to refuse. In addition to reviewing
the literature, I summarize key statistical measures establishing the size and scope of the
problem. Fortunately the reports are not all bad. The prevalence of unwanted lifesustaining treatment may be shrinking with the increasing implementation of Physician
Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment ("POLST"). Still, the problem remains significant.
In Section III, I identify twelve leading factors that cause clinicians to
administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment: (a) inadequate advance care planning, (b)
clinician misinterpretation of and confusion on advance directives, (c) uncertain validity
of advance directives, (d) uncertain application of advance directives, (e) demanding and
conflicting surrogates, (f) uncertain status of the surrogate decision maker, (g) uncertain
patient decision making capacity; (h) inadequate informed consent, (i) negligent
maintenance of medical records, (j) vitalistic philosophy of medicine, (k) consciencebased objections, and (1) financial incentives.
In Section IV, I establish that clinicians believe administering unwanted lifesustaining treatment entails little legal risk. This perception is based on three main
factors. First, clinicians are often able to obtain injunctions and guardianships
authorizing treatment. Second, the salience of unsuccessful cases for damages makes it
appear that administering unwanted treatment entails little legal risk. Third, this
perception is bolstered by the visibility of five legal obstacles to liability: (a) rejection of
the "wrongful living" cause of action, (b) rejection of private claims under the Patient
Self-Determination Act ("PSDA"), (c) the emergency exception to the consent
requirement, (d) safe harbor immunity under healthcare decisions acts, and (e)
conscience clauses.
Finally, in Section V, I demonstrate that this "no risk," "low risk" perception is
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wrong. I show how health care providers have been increasingly subject to sanctions for
administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment. I review nine theories of civil liability:
(a) battery, (b) informed consent, (c) negligence, (d) intentional infliction of emotional
distress, (e) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (f) breach of contract, (g) health
care decisions statutes, (h) POLST statutes, (i) Section 1983, and (j) the False Claims
Act. I also review administrative sanctions and criminal liability. Furthermore, not only
have providers already been sanctioned, but with recent increased patient protections,
they are also likely to be increasingly sanctioned.
The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been established for decades.
18
But, as with many principles in bioethics, like the related doctrine of informed consent,
there remains a wide chasm between legal and ethical principles, on the one hand, and
the reality of clinical practice, on the other. In contrast to other commentators, I have
aimed to establish that the prospect for enforcement and protection of patient rights is
not as dismal as commentators often depict. In fact, both private litigants and
government regulators have been imposing sanctions that are increasingly severe and
frequent.
II. Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going se f-determination. Itfollows
that each man is consideredto be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly
prohibit theperformance of lifesaving [treatment].
-Justice Alfred G. Shroeder, Natanson v. Kline' 9
For some individuals, the possibility of extended life is meaningful and
beneficial. For others, the artificial prolongation of life provides nothing beneficial,
serving only to extend suffering and prolong the dying process. 20 To accommodate
these varying attitudes, the rise of modern life-sustaining medical technologies was
accompanied by the rise of patient autonomy. During the 1970s and 1980s, appellate
courts across the country decided numerous cases in which patients and patients'

See Thaddeus M. Pope, LegalBriefing:Informed Consent, 21 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 72, 72 (2010).
19 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269
(1990). "[No tight is held more sacred ... than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person .... " Id.
20 See Thaddeus M. Pope & Lindsey A. Anderson, Voluntariy Stopping Eaing and Drinking:A Legal
Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REv. 363, 368-70 (2011) (discussing how
individuals with serious physical and cognitive impairments may find their lives no longer worth
living).
18
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families wanted to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining medical treatment, but their
health care providers were reluctant to cede to such requests. These courts almost
uniformly ruled for the patients, finding a right to refuse that was not outweighed by
state interests. The courts variously grounded this right in the common law,21 in state
24
23
constitutions, 22 in the United States Constitution, and in other legal sources.
These cases firmly established the right of patients to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. 25 These cases also established the rights of surrogates to exercise this
26
right for patients who were incompetent and unable to exercise it for themselves.
27
Today, all states have laws enabling patients and surrogates to refuse medical care.
Patients and surrogates decide whether life-sustaining medical treatment is of benefit
given their own values and given their own particular circumstances. Health care
providers must generally comply with decisions to refuse life-sustaining medical

See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 489 (Cal. App. 1983); In re Estate of
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (IR.1989); In reGardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987); In re
Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 422-23 (N.J. 1987).
22 See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (Md. 1993); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674,
682 (Ariz. 1987); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983).
23 See, e.g., CruZan, 497 U.S. at 280; In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980); see also
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220-22 (1990) (considering patient's right to reject
administration of antipsychotic drugs); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1985) (refusing to
authorize surgery to obtain a bullet from a suspect); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th
Cir. 2002) (affirming constitutional protections against unwanted medical treatment).
Interestingly, in the recent litigation over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the Solicitor General argued that "a requirement that individuals visit the
dentist twice a year" would probably violate the Constitution. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 20,
Dep't Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 2012 WL 748426 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2012) (No. 11-398).
24 Seegeneral&y Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385 (Miss. 1985) (clarifying proper jury requirements
for testing informed consent); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970) (ruling informed
consent is satisfied even if physician fails to disclose certain information).
21

25

See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-

LIFE DECISION MAKING ch.2 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2013); CLAIRE C. OBADE, PATIENT CARE
DECISION MAKING: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PROVIDERS § 7:1-8:24 (1991 & Supp. 2012); FAY A.
ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ch.7 (4th ed. 2007).
26

See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, at ch.4, 8; OBADE, supra note 25, 55 9:1-

11:11. I employ the term "surrogate" to refer to all those who are authorized to make health care
decisions on behalf of the patient, whether appointed: by the patient herself (agents, surrogates),
by a court (guardians, conservators), or by default legal rules (surrogates). Most patients are
unable to communicate with providers at the time decisions are made about stopping lifesustaining medical treatment. See J. Randall Curtis, Communicating about End-of-Ufe Care, 20
CRITICAL CARE CLINICS 363, 364 (2004). Therefore, these decisions are usually made by
surrogates.
27 Seegeneraly MEISEL & CERIMINARA, supra note 25, at ch.7; OBADE, supra note 25, at appendix A.
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treatment. 28
Since the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is well-established, patients can
often enforce the right ex ante by obtaining injunctive or declaratory relief. Indeed, that
is the procedural posture by which most right-to-die jurisprudence developed. 29 In
Quinlan, for example, Karen Quinlan suffered irreversible brain damage resulting from
respiratory failure. 3'

She was soon diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state.

Her family eventually decided to take her off the ventilator. 31 But Karen's health care
providers refused to comply, because they were concerned about criminal and other
liability. 32 The family litigated to the New Jersey Supreme Court to establish their right
33
to refuse treatment on Karen's behalf.
This right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is most properly characterized as a
"claim right" in the now-famous terminology of Wesley Hohfeld. 34 To say that a patient
has a "right" is to say both that the patient has a "claim" against the clinician for x and
that the clinician owes a correlative "duty" of x to the patient. 35 Or one might say that a

28

See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Ohio App. 1984) (authorizing

battery action for maintaining a patient in a persistent vegetative state ("PVS") on a respirator
against her previously expressed wishes); Miller v. HCA, Inc., No. 92-07830 (189th Dist. Ct.,
Harris Cty., Tex. Jan. 14, 1998) (awarding a $60 million verdict for resuscitation of a newborn
over family objections), rev'd on other grounds, 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003); Osgood v. Genesys
Regional Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee Cry. Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1996) (awarding $16.6
million when medical staff provided life-sustaining treatment to patient against her agent's
demands); Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. App. 1994); see also Barriersto End of Life Care Not in My ER, Not in My NursingHome, 11 L. & HEALTH CARE NEWSL. (U. of MD.), Spring 2004,
at 16, 20 [hereinafter Baniers] (discussing a nursing home fined by Maryland state agency for not
following resident's advance directive); Elena N. Cohen, Refusing and Forgoing Treatment: Liabilty
Issues, in 3 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §§ 18.07[1] & 18.07[2] nn.45-56 (Alexander M.
Capron & Irwin M. Birnbaum eds., 2005) (collecting cites); Amy Lynn Sorrel, Lawsuit Showcases
DNR Liabili Twist for Doctors, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007 (considering liability of doctors
who do not follow advanced directives).
29 Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 6.
30 In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 811 (N.J. Super Ct. Div. 1975)
31 Id. at 813.
32 Id. at 814.
33 In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), rev'd, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
34
WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 101 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
35 See Thaddeus M. Pope & Douglas B, White, Patient Rights, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CRITICAL
CARE (2d ed. forthcoming 2013). In contrast, under France's 2005 law, a doctor must "consult"
a patient's advance directive but is not obliged to "follow" it. Leo Wada, [A Guide to Advance
Health Care Directives], 184 REVUE DE INFIRMIERE 31 (2012) (Fr.).
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36
patient's "right" is a normative demand that imposes a constraint on the clinician.
Unfortunately, as demonstrated in the next section, clinicians frequently fail to fulfill
their duty to honor their patients' right to refuse.

III. Problem of Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment
For twenty years, medical and legal commentators have described
of unwanted life-sustaining treatment. In this Section, 1 first review studies
prevalence of unwanted treatment. Second, I identify and describe the
reasons that clinicians administer life-sustaining in contradiction to, and in
their patient's wishes.

the problem
showing the
twelve main
violation of,

A. Prevalence of Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment
Over the past two decades, legal and medical commentators have consistently
asserted that "patients are being saved against their will with some frequency.137 Since
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment was both legally and ethically established by
1990, I review some of the key statistical measures from 1990 to 2010. The rates of
clinician compliance with patient preferences are depressingly low. But, as I explain in
the second half of this subsection, there is reason for optimism. Over just the past few
years, the POLST paradigm has rapidly spread across the United States. POLST has
proven effective at ensuring that the treatment patients want matches the treatment that
those patients get.
1. FirstTwenty Years: 1990 to 2010
Commentators have almost uniformly concluded that clinicians are regularly
administering life-sustaining treatment to patients that those patients do not want. 38

The author states that the only
relations that imply normative constraints are claims and immunities. Id. "If a rule system
implies that a person has a duty or a disability, then her acts are restricted or constrained." Id.
Normative constraints are different from logical or physical restraints, but still restrict or limit
actions. Id. at 26.
37 Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance ith Advance Directives: Wrongful living and Tort Incenlives,
29J. LEG. MED. 133, 177 (2008). Even with an advance directive that refuses medical care, some
patient's wishes are not honored. Id.
38 Peters, slipra note 11, at 674. The author notes, "[o]verwhelming evidence indicates that
physicians routinely ignore patient preferences about life-sustaining care." Id; see also Annette M.
Browning, MoralDistress and PsychologicalEmpowerment in CriticalCare Nurses Caringfor Adults at End
of Lfe, 22 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 143, 147 (2013) (finding physicians frequently ignored absence
36

GEORGE RATNBOLT, THE CONCEPT OF RIGHTS 25 (2006).
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"[T]here do appear to be many cases in which patients are at risk of receiving treatment
inconsistent with their previously stated wishes . . . ."39 "[T]echnological advances are
used too often to save the lives of those who do not want to be saved for fear of
40
precisely the decline in quality of life they ultimately experience."
Both law and practice support a presumption that each patient will receive
aggressive interventions to prolong her/his life as long as possible. The patient can
rebut this presumption and decline treatment, even if that choice hastens the patient's
death. But many patients lack the capacity to make health care decisions at the end of
life. For decades, medical and legal experts have looked to the advance directive as a
central mechanism for assuring that these patients are treated in accordance with their
preferences.
Advance directives have been widely and heavily promoted and offered as a key
means by which patients can avoid unwanted treatment. 41 There has been a dramatically
growing emphasis on advance care planning, exemplified by major national initiatives
like National Healthcare Decisions Day 42 and the Conversation Project. 43 Similar

or inadequacy of consent); Jonathan Rauch, How Not to Die, THE ATLANTIC, (April 24, 2013) at
*2,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/05/how-not-to-die/309277/
("It
happens all the time.") (quoting Angelo Volandes). To be precise, most of the oft-cited evidence,
as discussed below, does not directly establish that clinicians ignore patient preferences. It
instead indicates that advance directives have little or no effect on outcome and process of care.
This is not exactly the same thing. Moreover, the surveys on which these estimates are based are
not representative. See T.R. Fried et al., Understandingthe Treatment Preferences of Seriousy Ill Patients,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1061 (2002); M. Danis et al., Patients' and Families' Preferencesfor Medical
Intensive Care, 260 JAMA 797 (1988).
39Joan M. Teno et al., Do Formal Advance Directives Affect Resuscitation Decisions and the Use of
Resources for Seriousy Ill Patients?, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 23 (1994); Joan M. Teno, The Wrongful
Resuscitation, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, 2008, available at
http://www.webmm.ahrq.gov/case.aspx?caseID=175 (citing several studies); Alice Dembner,
Do Not Resuscitate' Instructions often Ignored, Overlooked, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2003, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2003/09/ 11/do not resuscitateinstructions-ofte
n_ignored_overlooked/ ("A lot of people are getting care they don't want. I estimate it's
occurring in one in 20 deaths.' (quoting Joan Teno).
40 Lynch et al., supra note 37, at 148.
41 See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sudore & Terri R. Fried, Redefining the ' lanning" in Advance Care Planning:
PreparingforEnd-of-Life Decision Making, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 256 (2010); W.F. Benson &
N. Aldrich, Advance Care Planning: Ensuring Your Wishes Are Known and Honored If You Are Unable to
Speak for Yourself, CriticalIssue Brief, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2012,
available at
http://www.cdc.gov/aging/pdf/advanced-care-planning-critical-issue-brief.pdf.
42 See generaly NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DECISIONS DAY, http://www.nhdd.org/
(last visited
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initiatives have been developed and implemented at the state and regional levels. 44 And
45
new tools, like the "Prepare" website, are constantly being developed and launched.
Furthermore, innovation in the field of advance directives has not been limited to the
private sector. Many states have considered innovative legislation to facilitate advance
care planning. 46 And, at the federal level, there have been legislative and regulatory
4
proposals to expand Medicare coverage of advance care planning.
But, despite all this outreach and education, advance directives have actually had
rather little impact. 48 Cases of clinicians ignoring patient instructions are regularly
reported in the mass media.4 9 "Advance care directives correspond poorly with patient's
Apr. 30, 2013) (emphasizing the importance of end-of-life care planning).
43See generally THE CONVERSATION PROJECT, http://theconversationproject.org/starter-

kit/intro/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (helping people discuss their end-of-life care and wishes).
44 See generally RESPECTING CHOICES, http://respectingchoices.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2013)
(notable recognized organization, Respecting Choices in La Crosse, Wisconsin).
45 See generaly PREPARE, https://www.prepareforyourcare.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (helping
individuals make informed decisions regarding their medical care).
46 See Thaddeus M. Pope, LegalBriefing:Advance CarePlanning,20 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 362 (2009).
47See Personalize Your Care Act of 2013, H.R. 1173, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) available at
http://beta.congress.gov/113/bills/hrl173/113hrll73ih.pdf; Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda
Hexum, Legal Briefing: POLST: Physician Ordersfor Life-Sustaining Treatment, 23 J. CLINICAL ETHICS
353, 369 (2012).
48 See Lynch et al., supra note 37; Carl E. Schneider, The Best Laid Plans, 30 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 24, 24-25 (2000); E.H. Dobbins, End-of-Life Decisions: Influence of Advance Directives on Patient
Care, 33 J. GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING 50 (2007); Thomas J. Prendergast, Advance Care Planning:
Pi 'alls, Progress, Promise, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED. N34 (2001); P.H. Ditto et al., Advance Directives
as Acts of Communication.A Randomized Trial, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 421 (2001); Edward
J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits ofAdvance Directives.-A Histogy andAssessment of the Patient
Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249 (1997); David Orentlicher, The Illusion of
Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992); R. Sean Morrison et al., The
Inaccessibility of Advance Directives on Transferfrom Ambulatoy to Acute Care Settings, 274 JAMA 478,
481 (1995) (finding treatment decisions made "without consulting the patient's designated proxy
or living will" in 75% of cases); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Effects of Offering Advance Directives
on Medical Treatments and Costs, 117 ANNALS 599 (1992); Peters, supra note 11, at 674 (" [P] atient
preferences rarely affect treatment decisions.").
49 See, e.g., Susan Brink, Living Wills Often Ignored, MSNBC (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35610499/ns/health-health_care/#.USkWlaWJ940; Laura
Parker, In a Crisis, Do-Not-Revive Requests Don't Always Work, USA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2006; Vigoda,
Life Support, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1995, at 1D (explaining that 34% of physicians declined to
withdraw treatment at patient or surrogate request); Ostrom, Hospitals Don't Follow Living Wills,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 12, 1995, at 7A. As a further example, note that the National
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death found that 52 patients who suffered a
cardiac arrest in an NHS hospital over a two-week period in 2010 were resuscitated despite a
DNR order. Jenny Hope, Do Not Resuscitate Orders 'Ignored' as Doctors Tgy to Revive Patients Suffering
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care preferences." 0 In one recent survey only 44% of family members agreed that their
loved one's wishes were "completely followed and honored."51 Patient "wishes may or
may not be honored."5 2 Daniel Callahan observes that a "continuing problem with
'living wills' has been the unwillingness of many physicians to honor them."5 3 In short,
54
the evidence indicates that clinicians "routinely fail to honor" advance directives.
A significant number of medical survey studies confirm the dismal rate of
advance directive compliance.55 One study found that clinicians overrode advance
directives 25% of the time.5 6 Another study found that only 58% of clinicians followed
advance directives "most or all of the time." 5 And a third study found that clinicians
CardiacArrest, DAILY MAIL, June 1, 2012.

J. Andrew Billings, The Needfor Safeguards in Advance Care Planning,27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
595, 596 (2012) (reviewing studies); Lauren G. Collins, The State of Advance Care Planning One
50

Decade after SUPPORT,23 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 378 (2006).
51 Snapshot: Final Chapter. Californians'Attitudes and Experiences with Death and Dying, CALIFORNIA
HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION 21, 30 (2012), available at http://www.chcf.org/publications/2012/

02/final-chapter-death-dying.
52 Nicole Marie Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongationof'Life - A Cause ofAction that
Has Not Gained Traction Even Though a Physician Has Disregarded a 'Do Not Resuscitate' Order, 30
TEMP.J. So. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 221, 238 (2011).
53 DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 15 (1987).

Daniel P. Hickey, The Disuiifiy of Advance Directives: We Know the Problems, But Are There Solutions,
36 J. HEALTH L. 455 (2003); see, e.g., David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life
Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992); see also Erin Webley, Law, Insouciance, and Death in the Emergengy
Room, 19 ELDER L.J. 257 (2011); Susan A. Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life:
Questioning the Paradigmof Rights, 44 VILL. L. REV. 577 (1999); Gasner, supra note 12, at 502; Jo
Anne Herina Jeffreys, Advance Directives: Are They Worth the Paper They're Written On?, 190 N.J.
54

LAWYER 17 (1988).

55 One study found that only 22% of patients had advance directives, and even when conditions
for invocation were met, advance directives impacted care in fewer than 50% of cases. See
generally L.L. Heintz, Efficagy of Advance Directives in a GeneralHopital,56 HAW. MED. J. 203 (1997).
Another study found that, "patients in the ICU are frequently incapacitated and family member(s)
and/or the physician may override the advance directive requesting 'DNR' status." CYNTHIA
LYNN FERREL, THE EXPERIENCE OF CRITICAL CARE NURSES IN INITIATING HOSPICE CARE 5

(2007). For more, see, e.g., Susanna E. Bedell & Thomas L. Debanco, Choices about CardioPulmonagy
Resuscitationin the Hospital,310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089 (1984) (finding that one-third of patients
who were resuscitated did not want CPR); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Understanding of Elderly
Patients' Resuscitation Preferences by Physicians and Nurses, 150 WEST J. MED. 705 (1989); S.
Middlewood et al., Dying in HospitaL Medical Failure or Natural Outcome?, 22 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 1036 (2001); W.R. Mower & L.J. Baraff, 153 ARCHIVES 1NTERNAL MED. 375 (1993)

(finding that advance directives alone are less honored than if supported by surrogate).
56 Marion Danis et al., A Propective Study ofAdvance Directivesfor Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 881, 882 (1991).
57

Brenda Bergman-Evans et al., Uncovering Beliefs and Barriers: Staff Attitudes Related to Advance
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deviate from patient instructions in 65% of cases, looking instead to prognosis,
perceived quality of life, and family wishes. 58 Furthermore, even when clinicians do not
directly and overtly override a known refusal, they often unknowingly ignore refusals by
59
failing to read or consider the patient's instructions.
Perhaps the most significant and famous study of clinician compliance with
patient instructions is SUPPORT, the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences
for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments. 60 A two-year observational study of over 4,000
patients found that a mere 47% of physicians knew their patients' preferences regarding
avoiding, or consenting to, CPR. And for those patients who did have DNR orders,
61
half were written within two days of death.
A second phase of the SUPPORT study randomized nearly 5,000 patients to
either a control group or to an intervention group. 62 Patients in the intervention group
received regular prognostic estimates of survival, CPR outcomes, and functional
disability. 63 In addition, a specially-trained nurse maintained regular contact with the
patient, family, physician, and hospital staff in order to: elicit preferences, improve
understanding of outcomes, and facilitate advance care planning and patient-physician
communication. 64 Unfortunately, the high intervention in this group failed to improve
65
any of the measured outcomes.

Directives, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 347 (2008).
58

Steven B. Hardin & Yasmin A. Yusufaly, Difficult End-of-Life Treatment Decisions: Do OtherFactors

Trump Advance Directives?, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1531 (2004).

D.M. Westphal & S.A. McKee, End-of-LJfe Decision Making in the Intensive Care Unit: Physician and
Nurse Perpectives, 24 AM. J. MED. QuALITY 222 (2009) (finding that only 53% of physicians read
living wills).
60 A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriousy Ill Hoipitalized Patients. The Study to Understand
Prognoses and Preferencesfor Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1591
(1995).
61 Id. at 1594. (documenting the 'shortcomings in communication, frequency of aggressive
treatment, and the characteristics of hospital death.").
62 Id. at 1596.
63 Id. at 1592.
64 Id. at 1591.
65 Id.
The study found that "Patients experienced no improvement in patient-physician
communication.. .or in the five targeted outcome, i.e., incidence or timing of written DNR orders
... physician's knowledge of their patients' preferences not to be resuscitated.. .number of days
spent in an ICU, receiving mechanical ventilation, or comatose before death... or reported level
of pain." Id. Only 41% of patients believe that treatment reflected the preferences for palliative
care over more aggressive interventions. K.E. Covinsky et al., Communication and Decision Making
in Seriousy Ill Patients: Findings of the SUPPORTProject, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y S187 (2000).
59
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A more recent survey was conducted by the Pennsylvania Patient Safety
Authority ("PPSA"). The PPSA is an independent state agency charged with "taking
steps to reduce and eliminate medical errors by identifying problems and recommending
solutions that promote patient safety in hospitals" and certain other facilities. 66 The
PPSA analyzed over 200 patient safety reports from 2004 to 2008, and found that
approximately I in 5 involved patients that had received potentially unwanted
treatments.67
Unfortunately, the advance directive has had very limited success. 68 There are
several reasons for this. First, many patients have not completed one. And most of the
advance directives that have been completed are unavailable when needed. 69 Moreover,
even if both of these hurdles are overcome, more remain. To implement patient
preferences, advance directives must be reduced to medical orders. But advance
directives are often vague, leaving providers uncertain as to how the instructions apply
to the patient's current clinical circumstances. 70 For example, take the phrase "if I am
close to death:" does that mean within weeks, or within hours? Furthermore, even once
orders are written, they often do not travel outside the institution.

Who We Are, PENNSYLVANIA PATIENT SAFETY AUTHORITY,
http://patientsafetyauthority.org/Pages/\VhoAreWe.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
66

67

UnderstandingLiving Wills and DNR Orders, PENNSYLVANIA PATIENT SAFETY

AUTHORITY,

5(4)

PENNSYLVANIA PATIENT SAFETY ADVISORY 111 (2008); see also Emir Festic et al., Perspective of
Physicians and Nurses Regarding End-of-Life Care in the ICU, 7 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 45 (2012);
SHANNON BROWNLEE, CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, END-OF-LIFE CARE IN
CALIFORNIA: YOU DON'T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT (April 2013) available at

http://www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA /20LIBRARY /20Files/PDF/E/PDF / 20EOLWhat
YouWant.pdf.
68 Lesley S. Castillo et al., Lost in Translation: The Unintended Consequences ofAdvance Directives Law on
Clinical Care, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 121 (2011); Keith E. Sonderling, POLST: A Curefor
the Common Advance Directive - It's
just What the Doctor Ordered,33 NOVA L. REV. 451 (2009);
Marshall B. Kapp, The Nursing Home as Part of the POLST Paradigm, 36 HAMLINE L. REV.

(forthcoming 2013), available at http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2157497;
Henry S. Perkins, ControllingDeath: The False Promise of Advance Direcives, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL

MED. 51 (2007); Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Lving Will, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (2004).

See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
See Christopher M. Burkle et al., Physician Pers eclives and Compliance with PatientAdvance Directives:
The Role ExternalFactorsPlay on Physician Decision Making, 13 BMC MED. ETHICS 31, *9 (2012). The
study found that only 67% of physicians think that the phrase "no life support" in an advance
directive should be interpreted literally. Id.
69

70
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2.

Recent Improvements: POLST

POLST helps address all of these problems. 71

Meant to supplement, not

replace, traditional advance directives for those patients expected to die within the next
year, POLST has several advantages. 72 First, POLST is signed by both the health care
provider and the patient. 73 There is no need for interpretation and translation. POLST
is an immediately actionable medical order. 74 Second, since POLST is on a single-page,
standardized form, it is easy to follow. 75 Third, unlike DNR orders, POLST addresses
not just CPR, but an entire range of life-sustaining interventions, such as IV fluids,
77
76
antibiotics, a feeding tube, and artificial breathing. Fourth, POLST is transportable.
It is a brightly colored, clearly identifiable form that remains in the patient's chart and
travels with the patient, from hospital, to nursing home, to ambulance, to the patient's
home. 78 POLST is recognized and honored across all these different treatment
79
settings.
POLST protects and promotes patient autonomy better than advance directives
in at least four ways. First, POLST is usually created with a health care provider at or
near the time when an acute or serious chronic condition develops. It addresses the

71 Patricia A. Bomba et al.,

POLST: An Improvement over Traditional Advance Directives, 79

CLEVELAND CLINIC J. MED. 457, 457 (2012); C. Spillers & B. Lamb, Is the POLST Model Desirable
for Florida?, 8 FLA. PUB. HEALTH REV. 80-90, 80 (2011); Pope & Hexum, supra note 47.
However, without immunity, clinicians are reluctant to honor POLST. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B.
5562 before the Washington Senate Health Care Committee (Feb. 19, 2013) (video at 1:18:00).
72 See Bomba et al., supra note 71, at 457.
73 Id. at 460-62. If the patient lacks capacity, the POLST is normally signed by the surrogate.
74 Id at 458-59.
75 Id. at 462.
76 Id. at 459.
77 Id.
78

See Bomba et al., supra note 71, at 459.

79 For detailed explanations of POLST (customized for clinician, lawyer, and patient audiences in

multiple languages) see the extensive training resources on the California, New York, Oregon,
and West Virginia program websites. COALITION FOR COMPASSIONATE CARE OF CALIFORNIA,
POLST- Physician Ordersfor Life-Sustaining Treatment ForHealth CareProviders,
http://www.capolst.org/?for=providers (last visited Apr. 30, 2013); Compassion and Support at
the End of Life, Medical Ordersfor Life-Sustaining Treatment - Professionals,
http://www.compassionandsupport.org/index.php/for-professionals/molsttraining-center
(last visited Apr. 30, 2013); CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS, OREGON HEALTH & SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY, Oregon POLST Informationfor Health CareProfessionals, POLST,

http://www.oregonpolst.org/oregon-polst-registry/health-care-professionals/
(last visited Apr.
30, 2013); WEST VIRGINIA CENTER FOR END OF LIFE CARE, Information about Completing Effective
POST Forms, http://www.wvendoflife.org/POST (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
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patient's current situation, not a possible future scenario. Consequently, POLST has a
greater chance of being more informed and more relevant to the specific medical
situation at hand. Second, since the POLST form is highly visible, portable, and travels
with the patient's medical records, it is more likely available at the time that a decision
must be made. Third, since POLST is written in precise medical language on a
standardized form, it is better understood by healthcare providers. Fourth, since POLST
is signed by a provider, it has a greater chance of compliance by other providers.
While documentation is the centerpiece, POLST is more than just a form. It is
really a tool that provides a framework for end-of-life care conversations between
patients, their families, and their health care providers. Providers are encouraged to
discuss specific scenarios and treatment options. Patients and families have the chance
to ask questions and to make their wishes known. 80 In short, POLST gives patients
more control over their end-of-life care. As a "universal medical order" that is honored
across care facilities, POLST significantly changes how end-of-life treatment is provided.
Health care providers know immediately what patients do and do not want. And they
81
provide treatment and care consistent with those preferences.
B.

Twelve Leading Causes of Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment

82
Patients in the United States have the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
But clinicians often fail to honor this right. 83 Here, I turn to examine the reasons and
explanations for clinician noncompliance. Why are so many patients receiving so much
unwanted treatment?

80 Patricia A. Bomba, Landmark Legislation in New York Affirms Benefits of a Two-Step Approach to
Advance Care Planning Including MOLST: A Model of Shared, Informed Medical Dedsion-Making and
HonoringPatientPreferencesfor Care at the End ofLife, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 475, 478 (2011).
81 B.J. Hammes et al., The POLST Program: A Retrospective Review of the Demographics of Use and

Outcomes in One Communiy Where Advance Directives Are Prevalent, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 77, 77
(2012); Susan E. Hickman et al., The Consisteny Between Treatments Provided to Nursing Fadliy
Residents and Orders on the Physician Ordersfor I-'fe-Sustaining Treatment Form, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS
Soc'Y 2091-99, at 2 (2011); Susan E. Hickman et al., A Compason of Methods to Communicate
Treatment Preferences in Nursing Facilities. Traditional Practices Versus the Physician Orders for LifeSustaining Treatment Program, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 1241, at 2 (2010); Susan E. Hickman et
al., Use of the Physician Ordersfor iUfe-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) Paradigm Program in the Hospice
Setting, 12 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 133, 133 (2009); M.A. Lee et al., Physician Ordersfor Life-Sustaining
Treatment (POLST): Outcomes in a PACE Program, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOc'Y 1219, at 2 (2000);
Susan W. Tolle et al., A Prospective Study of the Efficag of the Physician OrderFormfor Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1097, at 2 (1998).
82
83

See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 48-70.
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There are twelve leading causes of unwanted treatment: (1) inadequate advance
care planning; (2) clinician misinterpretation of, and confusion on, advance directives;
(3) uncertain validity of advance directives; (4) uncertain application of advance
directives; (5) demanding and conflicting surrogates; (6) uncertain status of the surrogate
decision maker; (7) uncertain patient decision making capacity; (8) inadequate informed
consent; (9) negligent maintenance of medical records; (10) vitalistic philosophy of
medicine; (11) conscience-based objections; and (12) financial incentives.
1. InadequateAdvance Care Planning
Many decisions about life-sustaining treatment concern patients who have lost
decision-making capacity. 84 These patients cannot personally and legally refuse
treatment at the time its use becomes necessary. Consequently, refusal must be made
ahead-of-time. A traditional means for doing this is with an advance directive.
Unfortunately, most Americans have not completed advance directives. Two
2012 surveys show completion rates of just 23% 85 and 24%, respectively. 86 Several
other recent surveys show similar low completion rates of 35%87 and 33%,
respectively.88 On the other hand, some surveys show higher completion rates, for
example, of 60/0.89 Further, completion rates are higher among some populations. For
example, more than 50% of nursing home residents have advance directives, and that

84 See, e.g., J. Randall Curtis & Mark R. Tonelli, Shared Decision-Makingin the ICU: Value, Challenges,
and Limitations, 183 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 840, 840 (2011). "In the ICU,

decision-making often involves surrogate decision-makers, since patients frequently lack decisionmaking capacity due to their severity of illness." Id.
85 CALIFORNIA

HEALTHCARE

FOUNDATION,

supra note 51

(demonstrating percentage

of

California adults who have engaged in end of life planning).
86 Stacy M. Fischer et al., Advance Directive Discussions:Lost in Translation or Lost Opportunities?, 15 J.

PALLIATIVE MED. 86, 86 (2012) (drawing from cross-sectional study of adult patients admitted
for medical care in Denver area).
87 Susan L. Schrader et al., South Dakota's Dying to Know: A Statewide Survey about End of Life 12 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 695, 699 (2009).
88 NEBRASKA HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ASSOCIATION, Nebraska End-of-Life Survey Repor, at

*8 (Nov. 2011), available at

http://www.nehospice.org/associations/6715/files/EOLSurveyBooklet2011 .pdf.
89 THOMSON-REUTERS, National Survey of Healthcare Consumers: End-of-Life Care, at *4 (uly 2010),
available at

http://www.factsforhealthcare.com/pressroom/NPR -report_-EndofLfeCare07l0.pdf. The
survey demonstrates advance planning at rates of 8 0% for those over 65 and 40% for those
under 35. Id.
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rate jumps to 77% for nursing home residents over age 85.90 Still, the vast majority of
Americans have failed to make their preferences and choices known either informally to
family members or through a formal written instrument.
Even when patients do complete advance directives, they are often not available
when needed. 91 Physicians are frequently unaware of the existence of their patients'
advance directives. 92 Since advance directives are regularly signed years before they are
used, their existence and location often "vanish in the mists of time." 93 Indeed, fewer
94
than 30% of completed advance directives are recorded in patients' charts.
Why would the nonexistence or unavailability of an advance directive cause the
patient to receive unwanted treatment? Three factors combine to produce this result.
First, when the patient has not declared the treatment to be unwanted, it is presumed
that it is wanted. 95 End-of-life medicine is like a '"rain" that will proceed to the final
stop, unless the patient has a valid "ticket" to disembark at an earlier station. Second, as
a result of inertia instead of a deliberate choice, most patients have failed to rebut the
presumption. Third, application of this presumption is often wrong.
Robust survey evidence shows that most people would not want to continue
life-sustaining treatment in the face of serious illness. 96 In one recent survey, 67%
would prefer to "die a natural death" if their heartbeat or breathing stopped while only
90

Adrienne L. Jones et al., Use ofAdvance Directives in Long-term Care Populations, 54 NCHS DATA
1, 1-2 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db54.pdf.

BRIEF

91 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH

& HuMAN SERV., Advance Directives andAdvance Care Planning: Report to

Congress, 24-25 (August 2008), availableat
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2008/ADCongRpt.pdf [hereinafter DHHS].
92 R.F. Johnson et al., Advance Directives in the Medical Intensive Care Unit of a Communioy Teaching
Hospital,107 CHESTJ. 752, 755 (1995).
93 Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 68, at 35.
94R.S. Morrison et al., The Inaccessibilio of Advance Directives on Transferfrom Ambulatoy to Acute Care
Settings, 274 JAMA 478, 480 (1995); U.S. Living Will Registy Fact Sheet, U.S. LIVING WILL
REGISTRY, http://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/factsheet.shtm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
98Wendy G. Anderson et al., Code Status Discussions Between Attending Hospitalist Physicians and
Medical Patients at Hospital Admission, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 359, 364 (2011); available at
http://www.readcube.com/articles/10.1007/si1606-010-1568-6.
96 See DHHS, supra note 91, at viii (discussing necessity of advance directives to prevent
unwanted life-saving care for terminal patients). Indeed, application of the presumption is so
often wrong that some have cogently argued that the presumption should be reversed. We
should, they argue, presume that patients do not want life-sustaining treatment in catastrophic
circumstances and permit patients to opt out if they are in the minority that wants treatment. In
contrast, the status quo presumes that patients want treatment unless they opt out to refuse it. See
James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 185-86 (1993).
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7% would want medical providers to 'bse everything to prolong life.'9 7 In another
survey, 71% of individuals agreed that it is 'inore important to enhance the quality of
life for seriously ill patients, even if it means a shorter life.' 8 In short, we know
statistically that most patients do not want aggressive interventions at the end of life. 99
Yet, most of these patients get precisely that treatment they do not want, because they
never adequately "told" anyone that they did not want it.
2.

ClinicianMisinteopretalionof,and Confusion on, Advance Direclives

Even when the patient has completed an advance directive and it is available,
clinicians often misinterpret the advance directive to mean something not intended by
the patient. 1°°
In fact, "nearly half of health professionals misunderstand the
components of [advance directives]." 10 1 Around 2 0% of health professionals would
treat a patient contrary to the patient's instructions and defibrillate a patient with a clear
102
DNR order.
Clinician confusion on advance directives is both widespread and significant.
For example, in one study of 768 physicians in 34 states, 78% of clinicians
misinterpreted advance directives, thinking that the presence of an advance directive
automatically means that the patient is DNR. 10 3 In fact, a patient may or may not refuse
CPR in her advance directive. 0 4 Similar percentages of clinicians assumed that patients

97 CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, supra note 51, at 10.
98 NAT'L
& THE REGENCE FOUND., LIVING WELL AT THE END OF LIFE: A NATIONAL

J.

CONVERSATION 3 (2011), available at

http://syndication.nationaljournal.com/communications/National JournalRegenceTopines.pdf.
99See stipra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Additionally, although 70% of people say they
would like to die at home, only 2 5 % do. Frontline,Facing Death: Facts and Figures (PBS television
broadcast Nov. 23 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontine/facing-death/facts-and-figures/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2013).
o See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 68, at 36-37; ECRI INSTTUTE & ISMP, PENNSYLVANIA
PATIENT SAFETY AUTHORITY, UnderstandingLiving Wills andDNR Orders, 5 PA. PATIENT SAFETY

ADVISORY 111, 112-14 (2008), available at http://patientsafetyauthority.org/ADVISORIES/
AdvisoryLibrary/2008/Dec5(4)/Documents/dec;5(4).pdf; see also Alicia Gallegos, Cleaing Up
Confusion on Advance Directives, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 29, 2012, available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2012/10/29/prsal029.htm.
101 Gallegos, supra note 100; see also Ferdinando L. Mirarchi et al., TRIAD III: Nafionwide
Assessment of'Living Wills and Do Not Resuscitate Orders,42 J. EMERGENCY MED. 511, 512 (2012).
102 Gallegos, supra note 100.
103 Gallegos, supra note 100; Mirarchi, supra note 101, at 515.
104See Gallegos, supra note 100.
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with a DNR order means "do not treat." 105 In reality, DNR refers only to CPR and not
06
to other medical interventions. 1
3.

Uncertain Validiy ofAdvance Directive

Another reason that clinicians may not comply with a patient's advance
directive is because they doubt its validity. Understandably, clinicians need not, and
should not, comply with an advance directive that is technically deficient or inoperative
under the relevant state statute. 107 Indeed, the clinician does not even need to be correct
about the deficiency. It is sufficient that the clinician has a "good faith belief' in the
advance directive's invalidity. 10 8
For example, in FirstHealth Care Coporation v. Retinger, a nursing home refused
to remove a resident's feeding tube at the direction of his wife. 109 A court later ordered
the tube removed. 110 Subsequently, in defending against recovery of expenses incurred
by the nursing home, the resident's wife argued that those expenses would never have
been incurred had the nursing home removed the tube when she first requested.'
However, the nursing home successfully argued that it could not have complied with the
2
wife's earlier direction, because the resident's living will was invalid. "
105Ferdinando L. Mirarchi, UnderstandingAdvance Directives: What Do DTR Orders Really Mean?,

QUANTIAMD, https://secure.quantiamd.com/home/understanding-advance-directives
(last
visited Apr. 30, 2013); see also Gallegos, supra note 100 (explaining clinicians often believe DNR
patients should receive less care than designated by the order).
106 SeeJoseph L. Breault, DNR, DNAR, or AND? Is LanguageImportant?, 11 OCHSNERJ. 302, 303
(2011), availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3241061/.
107 See McCroskey v. Univ. Tennessee, No. 03A01-9409-CV-00356, 1995 WL 329133, *3 (Tenn.
App. 1995). Of course, the clinician may ignore a surrogate's instruction when, because of the
surrogate's status and/or the patient's condition, the surrogate lacks the right under state law to
refuse. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413, 419-21 (Wis. App. 2002) (denying
parents right to refuse because child was not in a persistent vegetative state); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-87 (1990) (denying family right to refuse without clear and
convincing evidence). The focus of this article is on clinicians ignoring valid refusals.
108 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. 29B 5 2974 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2013); see also, e.g., CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4740(b) (West 2009). "A health care provider.., is not subject to civil or criminal
liability or to discipline for unprofessional conduct for . .. [d]ecining to comply with a health
care decision of a person based on a belief that the person then lacked authority." Id. For
example, providers have significant uncertainty regarding the legality of a patient refusing oral
food and fluid. See Pope & Anderson, supra note 20.
109First Health Care Corp. v. Rettinger, 456 S.E.2d 347, 348 (N.C. 1995).
110 Id. at 368-49.
"'

112

Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 352 (Walker, J., dissenting), rev'd by First Healthcare Corp. v. Rettinger, 467 S.E.2d 243
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4.

UncertainApplicability ofAdvance Directive

Even when the patient has sufficiently completed a valid advance directive,
meaning it is available and has not been misinterpreted, it still might be unclear whether
the advance directive applies to the situation at hand." 3 After all, "advance directives
are typically not entirely clear and decisive in their application for a particular choice
about the patient's care."" 4 Even the most thoughtful and diligent clinician may be
unable to confidently determine how to apply many advance directives.
There are four main reasons that it might be unclear whether
patient's advance directive applies to the circumstances at hand. First,
directive may be hard to read. Second, it might be unclear if one of
"triggering" conditions has obtained. Third, it might be unclear whether

or how the
the advance
the requisite
instructions,
written in contemplation of one set of circumstances, apply to the patient's now very
different circumstances. Fourth, there are two special situations in which clinicians
doubt that the advance directive should apply: iatrogenic cardiac arrest and suicide
attempts.
(a) Poor Readability
The language of advance directives is notoriously vague. 115 For example, the
patient may decline "heroic measures" or "extraordinary treatment." The courts are
sometimes asked to interpret this sort of language. For example, in January 2009, S.S.
(2006) (following Judge Walker's dissent to find the living will invalid).
113 Bergman-Evans, supra note 57, at 350 (25% of respondents said the reason advance directives
were not followed was "the relevance of the [advance directive] was unclear to the present
condition"); see generally N.G. Levinsky, The Puroose of Advance Medical Planning - Autonomy for the
Patients or Limitation of Care?,335 NEW ENG.J. MED. 741 (1996); Gary S. Fischer et al., Can Goals
of Care Be Used to Predict Intervention Preferences in an Advance Directive?, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 801 (1997) (arguing that advance directives are "difficult to apply in specific clinical
situations"); Billings, supra note 50, at 597 (arguing to "err on the side of preserving life"
whenever the advance directive "does not convincingly address the current clinical situation");
A.S. Brett, Limitations of Listing Speafic Medical Interventions in Advance Directives, 266 JAMA 825
(1991) (arguing that advance directives do not provide clinically relevant information); Joan M.
Teno, Role of Written Advance Directives in Derision Making: Insightsfrom Qualitative and Quantitative
Data, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 439 (1998).
114Joanne Lynn et al., Dementia andAdvance Care Planning:Perspectivesfrom Three Countries on Ethics
and Epidemiolog, 10 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 271 (1999).
15 See Norman L. Cantor, Making Advance Directives Meaningul,4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 629,
631-32 (1998); Leslie Castillo et al., supra note 68, at 121-22; Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 68,
at 35-36.
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completed an advance directive, writing "I wish to live" in the "Optional Instructions"
section. 116 Just weeks later, a dispute erupted between S.S.'s wife and his siblings over
how to apply the advance directive." 7 On the one hand, this language seems to indicate
some sort of vitalist statement. But after reviewing extensive testimony and other
evidence, the court found that it simply meant that "S.S. wanted to live life to the fullest,
' 8
not to merely exist, unable to communicate and interact with his family and friends." "
(b) Unclear Triggering Condition
Many advance directives, often as a requirement of state law, condition their
effectiveness on the satisfaction of a triggering condition. For example, the patient may
instruct: "if I am in a permanent vegetative state, then I do not want a ventilator" or "if I
am terminally ill, then I do not want artificial nutrition and hydration."
Clinicians sometimes refuse to comply with an advance directive, because they
are unsure whether the triggering event has obtained." 9 For example, in Wright v. Johns
Hopkins Health Systems, Robert Lee Wright was suffering from AIDS and, in turn,
completed an advance directive. 120 In July of 1994, Wright was at Johns Hopkins
121
Hospital for treatment of kidney problems when he suffered a cardiac arrest.
Hospital staff performed CPR, saving Wright's life. 122 But he apparently suffered brain
damage during the cardiac arrest.1 23 After he awoke from a brief coma he could only
moan and call for his mother. 24 Wright died ten days after the administration of
25
CPR.'
Wright's parents sued Johns Hopkins Hospital, alleging that his living will had
instructed that he not be treated aggressively, and that hospital staff should have sought
their permission before resuscitating him. 126 But since no doctors had yet certified

S.I. v. R.S., 877 N.Y.S.2d 860, 864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
117Id. at 864-66.
at 866.
118 Id.
119 Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 175 (Md. 1999) (no certification
that patient was terminal); accord Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997).
120 Wright, 728 A.2d at 167.
121 Id. at 172.
122Id.at 173.
123 Id. at 172.
124 Wright, 728 A.2d at 172.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 173.
116
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Wright as terminally ill, his directives were not yet effective at the time he underwent the
127
blood transfusion and cardiac arrest in the hospital.
Clinicians have good reason to be cautious. For example, in Estate of Maxey v.
Darden, the Nevada Supreme Court held that clinicians may have improperly determined
that the patient was "terminally ill."12 8 The court concluded that since the state's
healthcare decisions act imposes a duty to act in accord with reasonable medical
standards when determining the patient's status, an attending physician's determination
that a patient is terminally ill is subject to judicial review. 129 "[O]nly if the physician acts
30
in accord with such standards is he or she entitled to immunity from civil liability."1
(c) Different Circumstances
Unlike POLSTs which are written for patients expected to die within the next
3
year, advance directives are often written years in advance of when they are used.' '
Consequently, the patient often writes her advance directive without contemplating the
precise circumstances in which she later finds herself. 132 Indeed, given the wide range of
potential situations, no one could possibly anticipate more than a small subset of
potential permutations. Moreover, the applicability of advance directives is thrown even
133
further into doubt by the fact that many patients change their mind over time.
127

Id. at 174.

128

Estate of Maxey v. Darden, 187 P.3d 144, 152 (Nev. 2008).

129

Id.

130 Id.

See Burkle et al., supra note 70 (finding "Eighty percent [of physicians] reported they were
likely to honor a patient's [advance directive] despite its 5 year age").
132 See, e.g., Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Mich. App. 1991) (dismissing battery claim by
Jehovah's Witness, because refusal was made in contemplation of routine elective surgery not
with awareness that death might result); see also In re T [1993] Fam 95 (CA) (similar); Matter of
Hughes, 611 A.2d 1148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); University of Cincinnati Hosp. v.
Edmond, 506 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio 1986); In re Estate of Dorone, 534 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987).
133 See Joan M. Teno, Advance Directives: Time to Move On, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 159
(2004); R.M. Gready et al., Actual and Perceived Stabili of Preferencesfor Life-Sustaining Treatment, 11 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 334 (2000); P.H. Ditto et al., Advance Directives as Acts of Communication: A
Randomized Trial, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 421, 428 (2001); Lockhart, The Stability of Older
Adults' Judgments of Fates Better and Worse than Death, 25 DEATH STUDIES 299 (2001); Angela
131

Fagerlin et al., The Use of Advance Directives in End-of-Life Decision Making, 46 AM. BEHAVIORAL
SCIENTIST 268 (2002); Emily Clough, A Critique of Advance Directives and Advance Directives
Legislation, 11 APPEAL REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 16, 29-30 (2006); T.R. Fried et al.,

Inconsisteng over Time in the Preferences of Older Persons with Advanced Illnessfor Life-Sustaining Treatment,
55 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1007 (2007); Rebecca L. Sudore & Terri R. Fried, Redefining be
'?lanning" in Advance Care Planning: Preparingfor End-of-Life Decision Making, 153 ANNALS
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The case of H.E. crisply illustrates the inapplicability of an advance directive,
because of the patient's materially changed circumstances. 134 Years before her current
hospitalization, H.E. completed an advance directive refusing blood products based on
her Jehovah's Witness faith. 135 But since the time that H.E. completed the advance
directive, she became engaged to a Muslim man and had promised to convert from
being a Jehovah's Witness into a Muslim. 136 The premises on which H.E. wrote her
advance directive were no longer valid for her.
(d) Jatrogenic Arrests
One particularly well-discussed situation in which clinicians think that advance
directives or DNR orders should be ignored is when a cardiac arrest is iatrogenic,
meaning it is induced by the therapeutic effort itself. This often happens in the
37
operating room.1
Clinicians often override DNR orders after an iatrogenic arrest. 138 For example,
in one survey of approximately 200 anesthesiologists, nearly two-thirds unilaterally

INTERNAL MED.

256 (2010);

JEROME GROOPMAN & PAMELA HARTZBAND, YOUR MEDICAL

Is RIGHT FOR YOU (2011); Jerome Groopman & Pamela
Hartzband, Why Do Patients Often Deviatefrom their Advance Directives?, KEVINMD.COM (Sept. 24,
2012), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2012/09/patients-deviate-advance-directives.html.
134HE v. Hosp. NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam).
135Id.at [4].
136 Id.at [13].
131
See, e.g., Andrew J. Redman et al., Use of Advance Directivesfor High-Risk Operations.A National
Survey of Surgeons 255 ANNALS SURGERY 418 (2012); David B, Waisel, Guidelinesfor PerioperaiveDoNot-Resuscitate Policies, 14 J. CLINICAL ANESTHESIA 467 (2002); Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J.
Cohen, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in the Operating Room, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1879 (1991); M.
Ewanchuk & P.G. Brindley, Perioperaive Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders-Doing 'Nothing' when 'Something'
Can Be Done, 10 CRITICAL CARE 219 (2006).
138 See generaly Margaret L. Schwarze et al., Surgeons Expect Patients to Buy-in to Postoperative LifeSupport Preoperativey" Results of a National Survey, 41 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1 (2013); Margaret L.
Schwarze et al., The Role of Surgical Error in Withdrawal of Postoperative Life Support, 256 ANNALS
SURGERY 10 (2012); Laine Friedman Ross, DNR orders and IatrogenicArrests During Dialysis: Should
'No" Mean 'No"?, 16 SEMINARS DIALYSIS 395 (2003); David J. Casarrett et al., Would Physicians
Override a Do-Not-Resuscitate Order When a CardiacArrest is Iatrogenic?, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
35 (1999) (discussing survey concerning likelihood that physicians would override a DNR when
hypothetical cardiac arrest is iatrogenic); Robert D. Truog et al., DNR in the OR-A Goal-Directed
Approach, 90 ANESTHESIOLOGY 289 (1999); David J. Cassarett & Lainie F. Ross, Overriding a
Patient's Refusal of Treatment after an Iatrogenic Complication, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1908 (1997);
Nicholas A. Christakis & David A. Asch, Biases in How Physicians Choose to Withdraw Life Support,
342 LANCET 642 (1993).
MIND: HOW TO DECIDE WHAT
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"assumed" that the patients' DNR orders were suspended in the perioperative period.
Only half discussed this assumption with the patient or surrogate. 3 9 Like surgeons and
anesthesiologists, other clinicians, like radiologists, may decide to ignore patients' DNR
orders, because if "arrest occurs as a direct or indirect result of a radiologic procedure,
radiologists believe they are responsible for the situation."' 14
(e) Suicide Attempts
In September 2007, 26-year-old Kerrie Wooltorton, depressed over her inability
to have children, attempted suicide by drinking anti-freeze.1 41 She then called an
ambulance and was transported to Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital. 42 She
arrived holding a "living will" in which she stated she did not want to be saved and was
"100 per cent aware of the consequences.' '1 43 She was alert and verbally confirmed the
written instructions. 144 Ms. Wooltorton explained that calling for an ambulance was not
146
a plea for treatment.145 She just did not want to die alone and in pain.
Clinicians honored Ms. Wooltorton's refusal, fearing that they would be charged
with assault if they treated her. 147 She died. 148 The case proved enormously
controversial. 149 But in late 2009, the coroner determined that the hospital acted
appropriately. 5 0 The coroner concluded that Ms. Wooltorton "had capacity to consent
139M.V.

Clemency et al., Do Not Resuscitate (DNVR) Orders and the Anesthesiologist. A Survey, 76
(1993).
140 Leonard Berlin, MaoracticeIssues in Radiology, 174 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1513 (2000).
141 Rebecca Smith et al., Suicide Woman Allowed to Die because Doctors Feared Saving Her Would be
Assault, TELEGRAPH, Sep. 30, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/6248646/Suicidewoman-allowed-to-die-because-doctors-feared-saving-her-would-be-assault.html.
142 Id. She had attempted suicide on several prior occasions. Id. Each time, she accepted dialysis
treatment to flush the toxic solution from her system. Id.
ANESTHESIA ANALGESIA 394

143Id.

144Id.
145

Smith et al., supra note 141.

Id.
147 Id.
148 Id
146

149

Id.; see also K.L. Koenig & A. Salvucci, Should We Honor PrehospitalDTR Orders in Patients Who

Attempt Suicide?, 16 J. EMERGENCY MED. 761 (1998); Christopher J. Ryan & Sascha Callaghan,

Legal and EthicalAspects of Refusing Medical Treatment after a Suicide Attempt: the Wooltorton Case in the
Australian Context, 193 MED. J. AUSTRALIA 239 (2010); Sascha Callaghan & Christopher James
Ryan, Refusing Medical Treatment after Attempted Suicide: Rethinking Capaci and Coercive Treatment in
LIght of the Kerrie Wooltorton Case, 18 J. L. & MED. 811 (2011); Sajid Muzaffar, To Treat or Not to
Treat: Kerie Wooltorton, Lessons to Learn, 28 EMERGENCY MED. J. 741 (2011).
150 Clare Dyer, Coroner Rules that Treating 26 Year Old Woman Who Wanted to Die Would Have Been
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to treatment which, more likely than not, would have prevented her death. She refused
1
such treatment in full knowledge of the consequences and died as a result.''
But the Wooltorton case was controversial precisely because it is the exception
to the rule. As a rule, clinicians do not honor treatment refusals linked to suicide
attempts.15 2 They assume, often correctly, that the person is suffering from a mental
53
illness that impairs judgment.
5. Demanding or Conflicting Surrogates
Yet another situation in which clinicians often provide unwanted life-sustaining
treatment is at the demand of the patient's own surrogate. The first four causes of
unwanted life-sustaining treatment pertain to challenges with advance directives. But
even if a patient has an advance directive refusing treatment, advance directives are
rarely self-executing.15 4 Clinicians usually turn to the patient's surrogate for direction.
But, notwithstanding the patient's clear intent in the advance directive to refuse
55
treatment, the surrogate often wants to continue treatment. 1
In such conflict situations, clinicians are overwhelmingly prepared to override
the patient's advance directive at the surrogate's request. 5 6 "A choice between the
Unlawful, 339 BRITISH MED. J. 824 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/339/
bmj.b4070 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
151

Id.

See C.M.A. Geppert, Saving Life or Respecting Autonomy: The Ethical Dilemma of DNR Orders in
Patients Who Attempt Suicide, 7(1) INTERNET J. L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS (2011), available at
http://www.ispub.com/journal/the-internet-journal-of-law-healthcare-and-ethics/volume-7number-1 / saving-life-or-respecting-autonomy-the-ethical-dilemma-o f-dnr-orders-in-patientswho-attempt-suicide.html#sthash.l70eMsoF.dpbs (last visited Apr. 30, 2013); see also Ryan &
Callaghan, supra note 149, at 239.
153 See supra note 152.
154 See supra notes 113-33 and accompanying text.
But see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. 5 2994D(3)(A)(II) (presuming that advance directives can be implemented automatically without
consulting an agent or surrogate: "[N]othing in this article shall obligate . . . providers to seek
the consent of a surrogate if an adult patient has already made a decision ... in writing.").
152

155

See Thaddeus M. Pope, 3 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 108 (2010) (collecting authority);

see also In re Pinette, No. 48-20040MH-1519-0 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 2004). Plus many
surrogates are willing to have it overridden. Carl Schneider, 1iabilioy for Lfe, 34 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 10, 11 (2004).

See Bergman-Evans, supra note 57, at 350. 63% of respondents said the reason advance
directives were not followed was "conflict in family with expressed wishes of the [advance
directive]." Id.; see Burkle et al., supra note 70, at *4 (finding physicians more likely to not honor
advance directive due to "fear of liability"); Blake Sypher et al., Autonomy, Informed Consent and
156
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liability risk posed by an emotionally distraught family... and that posed by a vegetative
patient who will never regain consciousness is not much of a choice." 157 And Liability is
not the clinician's only concern. Even prevailing parties pay transaction costs. An angry
surrogate's action, "even if frivolous will cost the provider in legal fees, stress, and
15 8
perhaps even professional reputation."'
Furthermore, clinicians may bend not only to demanding surrogates, but also to
conflicting surrogates. When the patient's potential surrogates cannot agree on a
decision or plan, the clinician may be hesitant to stop life-sustaining treatment.' 5 9
Clinicians err on continuing treatment when surrogates provide no clear direction,
preferring to wait until consensus develops. 160
6.

UncertainStatus of the SurrogateDecision Maker

Just as clinicians may refuse to comply with an advance directive because they
doubt its validity, 161 clinicians may refuse to comply with the treatment decisions of a

Advance Directives: A Study of Physidan Attitudes, 101 W.V.

MED.

J. 131, 133 (2005). 40% of 90

surveyed physicians would override advance directive based on the surrogate's demand, and 6%
would for "purely paternalistic reasons." Id.; Renee Martin, labi for Failing to Follow Advance
Direcive, PHYSICIAN'S NEW DIGEST (1999).
157 Justin Waddell, Dead Letters: Protecting the Intentions of a Living Will Declarant with a Dedicated
Advocate, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 807 (2012); ROBERT H. BLANK & ANDREA L.
BONNICKSEN, MEDICINE UNBOUND: THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL

INTERVENTION 216 (1994) ("[IWt would be legally dangerous for an institution to directly override

an advance directive. This usually only occurs when a family is divided about how or when to
apply it"). In one recent case, the physician complied with the patient's mentally competent
DNR order when the 78-year-old patient knew that he had a poor chance to survive from the
surgery. Ann W. Lamer, Doctor Sued for Following Do Not Resuscitate Order, RENAL & ULOROGY
NEWS, Dec. 19, 2012, www.renalandurologynews.com/doctor-sued-for-following-a-do-notresuscitate-order/article/273249/. But the patient's son sued the physician for not following his
(the son's) instructions to perform CPR. Id. The logic is analogous to that of a robber shooting
the convenience store clerk during a robbery. While murder is a more serious crime, it seems
legally safer because it reduces the risk of enforcement.
158 Amy Lynn Sorrel, IatgationStress: Being Sued Is Personalas Well as Professional,AMERICAN MED.
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2009, www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/11/02/prsallO2.htm; Catherine
Kleghorn, You've Been Served. Coping with the Stress of Medical Mapractice Itgation,NORCAL MED.
LIABILITY WATCH, Spring 2006, at 2; see also Waddell, supra note 157, at 812. "[O]n the other

hand, a provider that acquiesces to the demands of a surrogate that a living will be overridden
faces no liability risk .... ." Id.
159 See, e.g., Matter of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997).
160 Saitta & Hodge, supra note 52, at 232.
161 See supra Section III.B.3.
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patient's surrogate decision maker because they doubt the surrogate's authority. Indeed,
clinicians often have a legal duty to resist surrogates who exceed the scope of their
162
authority.
Surrogates are agents of the patient (the principal). Accordingly, they must act
in accordance with the patient's wishes or, where those are unknown, in accordance with
the patient's best interests. 63 But substantial evidence shows that the choices surrogates
make for patients are very often not the same choices that patients would make for
themselves.1 64 Surrogates often do not know patient preferences or best interests. And
even when these are known, surrogates often fail to make consistent treatment
decisions. Sometimes this is due to emotional and psychological barriers. Sometimes it
is deliberate. 165 In short, clinicians may administer life-sustaining treatment over the
objections of the patient's surrogate in certain circumstances.
7.

Uncertain PatientDecision-Making Capacit

Most patients lack decision-making capacity at the time life-sustaining treatment
is administered. 66 But some make a contemporaneous decision to refuse such
treatment. Some of the most famous right-to-die cases in American jurisprudence have
involved patients making their own treatment refusals: Elizabeth Bouvia, 167 Kenneth
69
Bergstedt, 16s and Larry McAfee.1
Clinicians might not honor contemporaneous decisions to refuse life-sustaining

See, e.g., Cardoza v. U.S.C. Univ. Hosp., No. B195092, 2008 WL 3413312 (Cal. Ct. App.
August 13, 2008); Noval v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, No. RC-1201608 (Riverside Cty. Super.
Ct., Cal. filed Feb. 2, 2012); In re Tschumy, No. 27-GC-PR-07-496 (Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct.,
Minn. Oct. 18, 2012) (Order).
163 See Pope, supra note 155.
164 See Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Fundamentalsof Surrogate Decision Making, 141 CHEST 1074 (2012)
(collecting studies).
165 See, e.g., Van Note Pleads JTot Guily to Father's Murder, LAKE NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 10, 2012,
http://www.lakenewsonline.com/article/20120910/NEWS/120919835/1001/news (reporting a
grand jury indictment alleging that Susan Elizabeth Van Note forged her father's name to an
advance directive to hasten his death so that she could inherit his estate).
166 See generaly A. Lautrette et al., Surrgate Deision-Makersfor Incompetent ICU Patients: A European
Perspective, 14 CURRENT OPINIONS CRITICAL CARE 714 (2008); S.M. Parks & L. Winter, End-ofL'fe Decision-MakingforCancerPatients, 36 PRIMARY CARE CLINICAL OFFICE PRACTICE 811 (2009).
167 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
168 McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
169 State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
162
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treatment because they doubt the capacity of the patient to make the decision.170
Indeed, clinicians should not automatically comply with all patient refusals. An
incapacitated refusal is no refusal at all.171 Acceding to an incapacitated patient's refusal
does not protect or promote her autonomy. So, clinicians need some range of
17 2
discretion.
But it must be carefully circumscribed, otherwise, clinician concerns about the
adequacy of patient understanding could swallow the patient's right to refuse.17 3 The
clinician who disagrees with the patient's refusal may find the patient incapacitated and
proceed to obtain consent from someone else.174
8.

InadequateInformed Consent

Many patients actually do consent to continued life-sustaining treatment. But
Their consent is often
this hardly means that they "vanted" that treatment.
Had the clinician adequately conveyed material
misinformed or uninformed.
information about the treatment, including alternatives and prognosis, then neither the
patient nor a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would have consented to
the treatment. In short, the patient made a decision to accept treatment; there was no
overriding of a refusal. Still, there is an overriding of the patient's autonomy. The
patient's consent does not reflect her values and preferences, because it was not
17 5
informed.

Kenney F. Hegland, Unauthorized Rendition ofLifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860,
864 (1965) (arguing that "the law should require a high degree of certainty that he really desires to
exercise this prerogative before giving it operative significance").
171 State v. Escamea, No. 2008AP1543-CR, 2009 WL 1586823 (Wis. App. 2009) (finding
emergency room patient did not have capability to make refusal decision and was not aware of
the risks and benefits).
172 Maria Aileen Soriano & Ruth Lagman, When the Patient Says No, 29 AM. J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE 401, 402-03 (2012) ("The need to determine decisional capacity is greatest
when refusal of treatment can result in death.").
171See Thaddeus M. Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel
Feinbeg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 121 (2005) (criticizing Feinberg's soft paternalism as a
solution to resolve liberty restrictions issues in the public health sector and suggesting to use hard
paternalism instead).
174 See, e.g., Payne v. Marion Gen. Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind.App. 1990); Hendon v. Wiliam
Beaumont Hosp., No. 176168 (Mich. App. May 28, 1996); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
175 Osgood v. Genesys Regional Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Cir. Ct. Genesee Cry., Mich.
1996) (explaining a decision where a clinician did not adequately explain treatment procedures);
170

Andrew Broder, She Don't Want No Life Support, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 595, 596 (1998);
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This was the allegation in Arato v. Avedon. 176 When Miklos Arato was
undergoing surgery to remove a diseased kidney, the operating surgeon detected a tumor
on his pancreas. 177 Arato's oncologists recommended "F.A.M.," a treatment employing
a combination of drugs which, when used in conjunction with radiation therapy, had
shown promise in treating pancreatic cancer in experimental trials.1 78 Arato consented
180
to this course of treatment.17 9 Unfortunately, the treatment proved ineffective.
Almost exactly one year after surgery, Arato succumbed to the effects of pancreatic
cancer. 181

The oncologists never disclosed to Arato the high statistical mortality rate
associated with pancreatic cancer. 8 2 It is an especially virulent malignancy in which only
5 to 10 percent of those afflicted live for as long as five years.18 3 Therefore, given the
practically incurable nature of the disease, there was little chance that Arato would live
184
more than a short while, even if the proposed treatment proved effective.
In their subsequent lawsuit, Arato's family alleged that such mortality
information was "material to Arato's decision whether to undergo postoperative
treatment."185 They argued that had Arato known the "bleak truth concerning his life
18 6
expectancy, he would not have undergone the rigors of an unproven therapy."'
Instead, he would have chosen to live out his last days at peace with his wife and
87
children, and arrange his business affairs.
Arato is hardly an isolated case. The quality of informed consent regarding end-

Rauch, supranote 38 ("I think that's the most urgent issue facing America today, is people getting
medical interventions that, if they were more informed, they would not want.") (quoting Angelo
Volandes).
176 Arato v. Avendon, 858 P.2d 598, 599 (Cal. 1993).
178

Id.
Id.

179

Id.

177

180 Arato,

858 P.2d at 599-600.

181 Id.
182

Id. at 600.

Arato, 858 P.2d at 602; see also PancreaticCancerSurvival Rates, EMEDTV.COM,
http://cancer.emedtv.com/pancreatic-cancer/pancreatic-cancer-survival-rates.html (last visited
Apr. 30, 2013) (explaining pancreatic cancer survival rates between 1995-2001 were 4.6°/0).
184Arato, 858 P.2d at 602.
185 Id.
183

186
187

Id.
Id.
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of-life options is generally quite poor. 188 And the consequence is far more aggressive
treatment than patients would prefer, if they understood the odds and alternatives. 189
Patients often do not know what options for palliative care and pain management are
clinically and legally available to them at the end of life. Furthermore, patients may be
hesitant to initiate conversations with their health care practitioners about certain endof-life options. Consequently, patients are not empowered to control their health care
decisions.
Both recognizing and responding to widespread reluctance to discuss end-of-life
issues, several states have enacted "right to know" legislation. 190 These statutes mandate
that if a health care provider makes a diagnosis that a patient has a terminal illness, then
the health care provider, on the patient's request, shall provide the patient with

See Mirarchi et al., supra note 101, at 517 (reporting that physicians spend just 5.6 minutes
discussing DNR and end-of-life issues with patients). "[A]ttorneys who create large numbers of
advance directives do not have the medical scope of practice to inform the patient [about
reversible and treatable conditions]." Id. In a 2012 survey, over 40% of physicians responded
that they hide or might hide "information from a patient about a terminal or preterminal
diagnosis." Phjsidans'Top EthicalDilemmas. Medscape 2012 Survey Results,
http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/pubic/ethics2012; see also Joan M. Teno et al.,
Change in End-of-Life Carefor Medicare Beneficiaries, 309 JAMA 470 (2013); J.R. Curtis et al., Missed
Opportunities During Famiy Conferences about End-of-Life Care in the ICU, 171 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 855 (2005); J.E. Nelson et al., When Critical Illness Becomes Chronic:
188

InformationalNeeds of Patientsand Families,20 J. CRITICAL CARE 79 (2005); E. Azoulay et al., Halfthe
Families of ICU PatientsExperience Inadequate Communication with Physicians,28 CRITICAL CARE MED.

3044 (2000).
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, § 11.03[B] [2]; see Jeffrey M. Peppercorn et al., American
Society of Clinical Oncology Statement: Toward Individualized Carefor Patients With Advanced Cancer,29 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 755, 755-56 (2011) (noting that despite improvements, conversations
about palliative care often occur late in treatment). To address communication problems, states
are requiring physicians to complete Continuing Medical Education ("CME') on end-of-life
issues. See, e.g., State Medical icensure Requirements and Statistics,2012, ACPONLINE,
http://www.acponline.org/education-recertification/cme/state-requirements/2012ama-requre
ments.pdf. Facilities and professional associations are also providing more training. OncoTalk,
for example, trains oncology fellows to communicate bad news, manage transitions to palliative
care, and handle requests for futile therapies. ONCOTALK, http://depts.washington.edu/
oncotalk/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
190 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (West Supp. 2013) (mandating information
and counseling about end-of-life care upon request by terminally ill patient); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5652 (West Supp. 2012) (raising awareness and encouraging better communication
between patients and health care providers about terminal illness); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. 5 2997C (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2013) (requiring practitioner of terminally ill patient to offer
189

information and counseling about palliative care); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,

patient's bill of rights for palliative care and pain management).

§ 1871

(2012) (outlining
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comprehensive information and counseling regarding specified legal end-of-life care
options. 191
Another important informed consent development should also curb
overtreatment. The development of patient decision aids is being incentivized at both
the federal and state levels.192 Decision aids are educational "tools" that help patients
understand the various treatment options available to them, including the risks and
benefits of each choice. These tools include educational literature with graphics,
photographs, and diagrams. They also take the form of videos and website-based
interactive programs. Growing evidence demonstrates that decision aids improve
patient knowledge and satisfaction. Moreover, patients using decision aids are more
likely to choose conservative treatment options. They are less likely to choose surgical
interventions. They are less likely to be admitted to the hospital. And they are less likely
93
to choose CPR.1
9.

NegligentMaintenance of Medical Records

As discussed above, the unavailability of an advance directive is often the
patient's own fault. Either he or she never completed one or he or she never made it
available to his or her surrogate or health care provider. But the unavailability of
194
advance directives is also often the fault of health care providers.
For example, terminally ill Arthur Johnson signed forms instructing paramedics
not to revive him if his heart stopped. 195 But when he was later transferred from

191

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

5 442.5. The specified end-of-life care options typically

include, but are not limited to: (1) the right to complete an advance directive; (2) hospice care at
home or in a health care setting; (3) a prognosis with and without the continuation of diseasetargeted treatment; (4) the right to refusal of or withdrawal from ife-sustaining treatment; (5) the
right to continue to pursue disease-targeted treatment, with or without concurrent palliative care;
and (6) the right to comprehensive pain and symptom management at the end of life, including
adequate pain medication, treatment of nausea, palliative chemotherapy, relief of shortness of
breath and fatigue, and other clinical treatments useful when a patient is actively dying. Id.
192 Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing: Shared Decision Making and Patient Decision
Aids, 24J. CLINICAL ETHICS 70-80 (2013).
193 Id. (collecting studies); see also Angelo Volandes et al., Randomized Controlled Study of a Video
Support Tool for Cardiopulmonagy Resuscitation Decision Making in Advanced Cancer, 31 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 380 (2013).
194 See Bergman-Evans, supra note 57, at 350 (reporting 40% of respondents explained the
advance directives were not followed because "[they] existed but were not on the chart[s]").
195 James Tozer, GrandfatherDies in Agony Because HospitalIgnored Signed DeclarationStaling He Didn't
Want to Be Revived, DAILY MAIL, June 9, 2010, available at
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hospice to hospital, his DNR form was not passed on. 19 6 Accordingly, hospital staff
tried to keep the 64-year-old grandfather alive against his wishes, leaving him to spend
197
the final three hours of his life in pain.
Advance directives and other instructions are frequently not placed into the
medical record. 198 Many facilities tried to address this problem through the use of
colored wristbands. 199 But they soon discovered that different facilities in the same
200
areas were using up to nine different colors to signify DNR.
10. Vitalistic Philosophy ofMedicne
While law and ethics strongly support patient autonomy and self-determination,
there remains a significant amount of physician paternalism. This is colorfully illustrated

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 1285363/Grandfather-dies-agony-hospital-ignoredsigned-declaration-stating-didnt-want-revived.html.
196 Id. See also Hallada v. Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 2103CA-002054 (Polk Cty. Cir. Ct., Fla.
Apr. 1, 2013) (Complaint filed) (alleging that DNR order was not transferred from hospital to
nursing home).
197

Id

See Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 35 (finding only 26% of patient charts accurately recorded
information about the patient's directive); Joan M. Teno et al., Advance Directivesfor Seriousy Ill
HopitalizedPatients:Effectiveness with the Patient Self DeterminationAct and the SUPPORT Intervention,
45 J. AiM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 500, 507 (1997) (stating only one in three advance directives is
placed in medical records); J. Virmani et al., Relationship of Advance Directives to Physician-Patient
198

Communication, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 909, 912 (1994) (stating 410% of patients believed
their doctor would know what to do in an end of life situation); CHARLES P. SABATINO, A.B.A.
COMMA'N ON L. & AGING, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 19 (2007) (identifying lack of provider knowledge regarding patients' directives as

part of difficulty with advance directives); Dembner, supra note 39 ("Do-not-resuscitate orders
are misplaced or overlooked in the hospital, or are not available at all because they are on record
somewhere else."); Daren K. Heyland et al., Failureto Engage Hospitalized Elderly Patients
and TheirFamilies in Advance Care Planning,JAMA INTERN MED., Apr. 2013, at 1-10 (E-publication
ahead of print) (finding six times as many patients wanted comfort measures only as had that
documented in their medical records).
199See, e.g., TEXAS HOSP.L ASS'N, COLOR-CODED WRISTBAND STANDARDIZATION PROJECT IN

2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.tha.org/HealthCareProviders/Issues/
PatientSafetyQuality/Wristband/TX%20Wristband%2OToolkit Color.pdf.
200 Id. State medical associations have made substantial progress toward making wristband use
more consistent and uniform. See id.
(noting by fall 2008 over 25 states had implemented hospital
wristband use for select purposes). The use of POLST has also improved the clarity and
transportability of medical records. Susan E. Hickman et al., The POLUT (PhysidansOrdersfor LifeSustainingTreatment) Paradigmto Improve End-of -Life Care, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 119, 119 (2008).
TEXAS
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by Dr. Yoonessi's arrogant and reckless disregard for his patient's rights. 201 Dr.
Yoonessi thought it was wrong to forgo therapeutic interventions no matter how limited
202
the benefit, no matter how long the odds, and no matter how severe the side effects.
Many physicians are not ready to "give up." In general, many physicians still
consider it "their responsibility to make treatment decisions that they believe are in the
patient's best interest and that patient preferences should be ignored if they are
inconsistent with the physician's view of the patient's best interests." 203 Even when
physicians know a patient's preference, they may disregard it as "not in the patient's best
20 4
interests."
11. Conscience-Based Objection
Clinicians may object to complying with patient wishes not only on professional
or paternalistic grounds, but also on personal grounds. For example, "a healthcare
provider may have a powerful personal moral bias that all life is worth saving and that
everything possible should be done for every patient. ' 205 Accordingly, that provider
may intentionally ignore the patient's instructions.
Nearly all states grant clinicians the right of refusal based on conscience or

See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text; see infra notes 482-502 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
203 David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REv. 1255, 1281 (1994); see Burkle et al.,
supra note 70, at 7 (finding 15% of physicians agreed they should be allowed to provide care
notwithstanding advance directives). "Physicians should be allowed to provide care independent
of the advance directive as patients do not have the knowledge to best appreciate the
idiosyncrasies involved with the practice of medicine." Id.; see also Nicholas A. Christakis &
David A. Asch, Medical Specialists Prefer to Withdraw Familiar Technologies when Discontinuing Life
Support, 10 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 491, 491 (1995) (reporting specialty physician preference for
withdrawing their "own" form of life support over other specialties'); Graeme M. Rocker & J.
Randall Curtis, Caringforthe Dying in the Intensive Care Unit: In Search of Clarity, 290 JAMA 820, 821
(2003) ("Physician biases influence willingness to withhold or withdraw life support."); Dembner,
supra note 39 (statement of Dr. David Clive) ("There's still a fair number of doctors around who
are uncomfortable with patients being DNR ... [It may be the physician's] medical opinion that
the patient is not sufficiently ill to warrant the DNR order.').
204 Bernard Lo, Improving Care Near the End of Life: Why Is It So Hard?, 274 JAMA 1634, 1635
(1995); see also Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Resuscitating Advance Directives, 164 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1501, 1502 (2004) (concluding that advance directives "frequently have little
impact on clinical decisions").
205 Saitta & Hodge, supra note 52, at 231 (quoting E-Mail from Jack E. Hubbard, Ph.D., M.D.,
Doctor of Adult Neurology, *Minneapolis Clinic of Neurology (June 24, 2011)).
201

202
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other moral objections. 2 6 Most of these states have entirely open-ended criteria that
permit providers to decline to comply with patients' wishes for any reason. Protecting
the moral values of clinicians is important. 207 But some have observed that the scope of
208
conscience clauses "may give clinicians license to ignore patients' wishes."
12. FinancialIncentives
A final reason that clinicians administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment is

that overtreatment is well-reimbursed. 2
more."

210

9

Clinicians are often "paid more for doing

One very visible manifestation of this financial incentive is massive and still-

growing fraud and abuse enforcement.21 '

Health care providers are routinely charged
212
with fraudulently administering unwanted treatment in order to maximize revenues.
At one extreme, hospitals have been accused of "extend[ing] hospitalization
through assigning release dates designed only to coincide with the expiration

of

insurance benefits" rather than "on the basis of the patient's condition." 213 But even at
206

See Thaddeus M. Pope, Legal Briefing. Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J. CLINICAL

ETHICS 163 (2010) [hereinafter Conscience Clauses]; Castillo et al., supra note 68, at Appendix, Table

3 (excepting Indiana and Michigan from states that have provider right of refusal statutes).
207 The author is a legal consultant to a committee of the American Thoracic Society that is

drafting a policy statement tentatively titled "Managing Conscientious Objection in Intensive
Care Medicine."
208 Castillo et al., supra note 68, at 124; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Not Only the Doctor's Dilemma: The
Complexit of Conscience in Medicine, FAULKNER L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Elizabeth Sepper,
Taking Conscience Seriousy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 (2012).
209 Peter J. Kalis & Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let's Act Locally, 50 DuQ. L. REV. 253, 258
(2012) (noting "our [medical] payment system rewards medical utilization ....");S. Elizabeth
Wilborn, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Where There is a Right, There Ought to be a Remedy, 25 N.
KY. L. REV. 649, 658 (1998); Sunil Eappen et al., Relationship Between Occurrence of Sur ical
Complications and Hospital Finances, 309 JAMA 1599 (2013) (finding that hospitals have little
incentive to reduce surgical errors because they get paid for longer stays and extra care that
patients require for the resulting complications).
210 David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 6 FIU L.
REV. 67, 71 (2010); Lars Noah, Turn the Beat Around: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-AssistDevices, 39
WM. IMITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1231-36 (2013).
211 See, e.g., T. R. Goldman, Eliminating Fraudand Abuse, HEALTH AFFAIRS HEALTH POL'Y BRIEF
(July 31, 2012).
212 See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Hospitals: The Cost of Admission (CBS television broadcast Dec. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50136261n; Reed Abelson, U.S. Settles
Accusations That Doctors Overtreated,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013; U.S. v. Vitas Hospice Care, Inc., No.
3:07-CV-00604-M (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2009) (complaint alleging hospice kept treating patients
even when they were no longer qualified).
213 Paulk v. Nat'l Med. Enters., 679 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. App. 1996) (Stone, J., dissenting). On

JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW

VOL. IX NO. 2

a less nefarious level, physicians "will continue to allocate their time to activities that
generate higher compensation. '214 The current fee-for-service reimbursement model
incentivizes clinicians to provide more treatment and to deploy more technology, even
215
more than the patient desires.
13. Summary
In sum, there are many factors, working both independently and interdependently, that cause clinicians to administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
Facilitating the operation and impact of these factors is the clinician's belief that
216
administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment entails little legal risk.
IV. Clinicians Think that Providing Life-Sustaining Treatment without Consent
Entails Little Legal Risk
"The general view from the medical front... is that you can't be sued for doing
too much, you can only be sued for doing too little. '217 Indeed, a 2012 survey found
the other hand, other lawsuits allege that providers' financial incentives cause them to provide
less, not more, treatment. See, e.g., Yarick v. Pacificare of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1162 (Cal.
App. 2009). Slowly, financial incentives are being more aligned and correlated to quality
outcomes. See, e.g., Dep't Health & Human Services, Medicare Program; HospitalInpatient ValueBased PurchasingProgram, 76 Fed. Reg. 2454 (Jan. 13, 2011); David Eggert, Insurer, Mich. Hospitals
Switch Reimbursement Plan, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/
Insurer-Mich-hospitals-switch-reimbursement-plan-4472545.php.
214 Orentlicher, supra note 203, at 1275-76.
215 See, e.g., John D. Lantos, Hooked on Neonatology: A PediatricianWonders aboutNICUs' Hidden Cost
of Success, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 233, 237 (2001); Ronen Avraham, ClinicalPractice Guidelines - The
Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 8-9 (2011) (discussing
"offensive medicine"). Only 17% of physicians think "the financial cost of providing medical
care should . . . impact a decision to honor or forgo expressed wishes noted in an [advance
directive]." Burkle et al., supra note 70, at Table 5; see also Massachusetts Expert Panel on End-ofLife Care, Patient Centered Care and Human Mortality: The UTrengy of Health System Reforms to Ensure
for
Excellence
in
Care,
Wishes
and
Accountabiliy
Respect
for
Patients'
http://mass.gov.healthcare/expertpanel.
216 If the threat of sanctions appeared more imminent or serious, clinicians would work harder to
mitigate some of these factors. But "the media encourages doctors to practice defensive
medicine by publishing stories about patients with obscure presentations of diseases who die
because doctors 'just didn't do enough."' BirdStrike, Cause of Death: Defensive Medicine, KEVINMD
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2012/10/death-defensive-medicine.html.
217 When Is Medical Treatment Futile?, ABC RADIO NATIONAL (Nov. 5, 2012) (quoting Dr. Peter
Saul), availableat
http:/ /www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/healthreport/when-is-medical-treatmentfutile3f/4349592. See also Stephen Wear et al., Toleration of Moral Diversiy and the Conscientious
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that a majority of physicians agree that there is less liability risk for "maintaining
someone alive against their will than mistakenly allowing them to die."218 The thinking
among clinicians has been that if "you do intervene and you shouldn't have, the worst
that will happen is that the patient will live a little longer and that you'll never be held
accountable if you keep the patient from dying." 219 Clinicians find it "counterintuitive"
220
to be "held accountable for preserving the life of a patient."
And clinicians are not the only ones to reach this conclusion. Attorneys often
advise health care institutions and physicians to "play it safe" when in doubt and just
administer treatment. 221 This advice seems consistent with the literature. Legal
commentators have generally agreed that "there are few, if any, effective incentives for
physicians and other healthcare providers to be scrupulous in their adherence to advance
directives. ' 222 "[N]either judges nor lawmakers have yet formulated coherent or
effective remedies for physicians' failures to comply with the instructions patients have
223
provided."
Other legal commentators have similarly concluded that the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment is "illusory," because there is no effective remedy. 224 They observe

Refusal by Physicians to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 147, 153 (1994)
("Many physicians seem to believe that an active withdrawal involves significantly more legal
jeopardy than a passive withdrawal ....
'"). There is some basis for thinking that there is more
legal risk from taking no action. Bryan A. Liang & Justin A. Zivin, Empirical Characteristics of
Litigation Involving Tissue Plasminogen Activator and Ischemic Smoke, 52 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED.
160 (2008). For example, in the emergency context, one study found 29 of 33 cases alleged
failure to treat with tPA but only 3 alleged injury from the administration of tPA. Id.; see also
David E. Thiess et al., Hot Topics in Risk Managementin Neurologic Practice,28 NEUROLOGY CLINICS
429, 431 (2010).
218 Burkle et al., supranote 70, at 7.
219 Tamar Lewin, Ignoring 'Right to Die' Direclives, Medical Community Is Being Sued, N.Y. TIMES, June
2, 1996, at Al (quoting Nancy Dickey).
220 CHRISTOPHER DANBURY ET AL., LAW AND ETHICS IN INTENSIVE CARE 125-26 (2010).
221 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25 at § 11.01 [A].
222 Lynch et al., supra note 37, at 138.
223 Lynch et al., supra note 37, at 138; see also id. at 139 (noting "the current legal framework offers
little support for recovery"); id. at 147 (observing "cases in which damages have been awarded...
have been few and far between"); id. at 148 (cautioning "optimists should be extremely
cautious"); id. at 177 (declaring "The current legal structure has proven impotent to resolve this
problem."); see also Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment-A Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 169 (1997); S. Elizabeth Wilborn,
The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment. Where There Is a Rght, There Ought to Be a Remedy, 25 N. KY. L.
REv. 649 (1998).
224 Channick, supra note 54, at 619-20; see also Donohue, supra note 11, at 394 (concluding that
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that "very few health care professionals or institutions have been held liable for damages
for administering ...life-sustaining treatment without authorization .
,,225
Others
have similarly concluded that "there is no effective penalty for disregarding a living
will." 226 "[N]o recognized cause of action has really emerged allowing for the awarding
of monetary damages.... Recovering... damages is not a realistic option at the present
227
time.
Reviewing this literature, a 2011 Resolution to the American Bar Association
House of Delegates concluded that the law "does not adequately protect patients from
unwanted treatment," because "the threat of lawsuit does not adequately deter unwanted
22 8
treatment."
There are three main reasons that medical and legal commentators have
concluded that there is little legal risk in administering ife-sustaining treatment without
consent. First, clinicians can often obtain ex ante injunctions and guardianships,
judicially authorizing treatment over patient or surrogate objections. Second, even when
overriding patient refusals without prior judicial permission, sanctions appear unlikely
because of the salience of unsuccessful ex post cases for damages. Third, these
unsuccessful cases have highlighted four formidable hurdles to establishing liability.
A. Clinicians Can Often Obtain Ex Ante Injunctions and Guardianships
Clinicians bear no risk for administering unwanted treatment, if they get
permission to do so. Treatment can be simultaneously consensual and unwanted,
because the clinician obtains permission from someone other than the patient.
Procedurally, there are three means by which a clinician can achieve this. First,
the clinician can seek the court appointment of a guardian, and then get consent from

patients "have encountered significant difficulty in realizing damages for these claims").
225 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, at 5 11.11.
226 Waddell, supra note 157, at 818.
227 Saitta & Hodge, supra note 52, at 238. A handful of commentators have been more optimistic.
See, e.g., Renee Martin, Iabiliy for Failingfor Follow Advance Directives, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST
(Sept. 1999), http://www.physiciansnews.com/1999/09/14/liability-for- failing-to-followadvance-directives/ ("[C]ivil liability for failure to respect end-of-life decisions may grow.");
Rodriguez, supra note 11; William H. Pedrick, Dignified Death and the Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 387 (1991); William H. Pedrick, AriZona Tort Law and Dignifled Death, 22 ARIZ. ST. L. REV.
63 (1990).
228 A.B.A., COMM'N ON L. & AGING, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION
106B, at 6 (2011).
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the guardian. 229 Second, the clinician can seek an injunction granting permission to
administer the treatment. 230 Third, in some states, the clinician can select the surrogate
231
without any court involvement whatsoever.
For example, in In re Duran,Maria Duran needed a liver transplant. 232 Since she
was a Jehovah's Witness, she went to the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
because she had been told that it had performed liver transplants without blood
transfusions. 233 Ms. Duran discussed her religious beliefs and her desire to not be given
any blood products or transfusions. 234 She also executed an advance directive,
specifically stating that she would refuse any blood, no matter what her medical
condition.

235

Unfortunately, Ms. Duran's body rejected the liver as well as a second liver
transplant. 236 Ms. Duran was comatose and her condition was worsening. 237 Clinicians
thought that she would die within 24 hours if she were not given a transfusion. 238 So,
Ms. Duran's husband petitioned the court to be appointed her "emergency limited

See, e.g., In re Estate of Dorone, 534 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. 1987) (affirming trial court's
appointment of hospital administrator to consent to blood transfusions on behalf of adult
Jehovah's Witness); In re Lydia A. Hall Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 682, 682 (N.Y. Sup. 1982)
(discussing hospital's attempt to seek authorization to continue hemodialysis treatment). Cf.
Pope, Surrogate Selection, supra note 164 (collecting cases where clinicians replaced surrogates who
refused to consent to the proposed treatment plan).
230 See, e.g.,
several cases from the Consent and Capacity Board of Ontario, including: BT, 2011
CanLI 20996 (ON C.C.B.) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onccb/doc/2011/
2011 canlii20996/2011 canii20996.html; BT, 2011 CanLIl 20996 (ON C.C.B.) (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onccb/doc/2011/2011canlii20996/201 lcanlii20996.html; LF,
2010 CanLlI 56501 (ON C.C.B.) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onccb/doc/
2010/2010canlii56501/2010canlii56501.html. While providers obtain injunctions authorizing
treatment, patients are also able to obtain injunctions ordering clinicians to comply with their
refusals. See Kathleen E. Wherthey, Causes of Action to Recover Damages for Health Care Provider's
Failure to Compy with Advance Directive, in 16 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 83, § 2 (2012) (collecting
authority). Indeed, one court relied on the availability of ex ante relief as a reason to deny expost
relief. Duarte v. Chino Comm. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
231 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(1) (2004).
232 769 A.2d 497, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
229

233

Id.

234

Id.

235 Id.
236

Id at 501.

237

Id.
Duran, 769 A.2d at 501.
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guardian for the purpose of consenting to a blood transfusion." 239 The court granted
2
Mr. Duran's petition. 240 He then consented to the transfusion. 41
Health care providers sometimes seek, and obtain, third-party consent to
override what they consider to be a foolish decision by the patient or surrogate. But
they might also seek third-party consent because they are unsure whether the surrogate
has the authority to refuse treatment on the patient's behalf. 242 Providers invariably
continue administering the rejected treatment during the pendency of the proceedings.
B.

Salience of Unsuccessful Ex Post Cases

A second reason that clinicians think administering life-sustaining treatment
without consent entails little legal risk is because of the salience of several unsuccessful
cases for damages. 243 These unsuccessful cases are prominent in clinicians' perceptions
relative to other cases. Consistent with now well-accepted principles of behavioral
economics such as the availability heuristic, clinicians tend to overemphasize these cases
244
and consequently overweigh the probability that future cases will have a similar result.
This is the same psychological phenomenon that causes travelers to overestimate the
245
risks of plane crashes relative to the much higher risk of an automobile crash.
This exaggeration of the impact of unsuccessful cases is well-illustrated by Miller
v. HCA. 246 In August 1990, Karla Miller went into premature labor at 23 weeks
gestation. 247 Clinicians told the Millers that their baby would not survive without
assistance and that there was a high probability their baby would suffer from severe and

239

Id

240 Id

Id. Ms. Duran's health care agent appealed this order. Id. at 500. The appellate court held that
the trial court abrogated Ms. Duran's right when it appointed the emergency limited guardian. Id
at 508.
242 Grace Plaza of Great Neck v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
243 Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Batteg, Wrongul Iving and the R'ght of Bodily
241

Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 997, 998 (1999); see, e.g., HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187. 189
(Tex. App. 2000), affd, 118 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. 2003) (holding hospital not liable in tort for
resuscitating patient without consent).
244 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulalion, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1354-55,
1405-07 (2011); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998).
245 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW
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permanent disabilities. 248 The Millers instructed that clinicians not resuscitate their
infant or take any extraordinary measures to keep her alive. 249 But the hospital
administration determined that if the baby was born alive and weighed more than 500
grams, it would be resuscitated. 25 0 Sidney Miller was born alive. 251 And consistent with
the hospital policy, but contrary to her parents' instructions, the hospital resuscitated
Sidney. 252 Today, she is profoundly mentally retarded, has cerebral palsy, cannot see,
25 3
cannot walk, cannot talk, and cannot feed herself.
Two years after Sidney's birth, the Millers sued the hospital and its parent
corporation, Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA"), alleging battery and negligence.
After a trial in 1997, a jury found that the HCA had acted without consent and awarded
the Millers $60 million ($29.4 million in actual damages for medical expenses, $17.5
25 4
million in prejudgment interest, and $13.5 million in exemplary damages).
Three years later, this verdict was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court.25 The
court held that a physician confronted with an emergency situation may provide lifesaving treatment without first obtaining parental consent. 256 The ruling was extensively
covered by medical journals and newsletters, giving it significant conspicuousness and
prominence.257
Like the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Miller,in Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, the
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HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 118 S.W.3d 758, 762 (Tex. 2003).
Id. at 761; see Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) (holding wrongful life cause
of action "impossible to rationally decide whether the plaintiff has been damaged at all").
257 See, e.g., Andis Robeznieks, Texas Court Dismisses Battey Chage in Resuscitation Case, -AM. MED.
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2003); George J. Annas, Extremely Preterm Birth and ParentalAuthofity to Refuse
Treatment-The Case of Sidney Miller, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2118 (2004), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/1O.1056/NEJMiim041201; John J. Paris, Resuscitation Decisionsfor
"FetalInfants," 115 PEDIATRICS 1415 (2005); J.C. West, Parents Do Not Have Auhoriy to Refuse to
Consent to Resuscitalion of Fetus Born Alive, 21 J. HEALTHCARE RISK MANAGEMENT 33 (2001),
available at http://oninelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jhrm.5600210308/pdf. The intermediate
appellate court's reversal, on other grounds, was also covered by the medical press. See, e.g., Vida
Foubister, Texas Court Overturns Ruling on Resuscitation of PrematureBaby, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 5,
2001.
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Washington Supreme Court similarly held that a physician's continued resuscitation of a
newborn child after 15 minutes of asystole came within the medical emergency
2 8
exception to informed consent. 5
In Stewart-Graves, the neonatologist was confronted with an emergency
circumstance following the delivery of a severely premature infant.259 Despite the
parents' pre-delivery refusal of consent to life-sustaining treatment, the court held that
the hospital was not required to seek court intervention before providing life-sustaining
treatment without committing battery. 260 The neonatologist could not make an
informed assessment of the infant's condition until after a live birth. 261 The infant was
born alive, but in distress.2 62 Consequently, there was no time for the hospital to obtain
court intervention to override the parents' refusal of consent without jeopardizing the
263
infant's life.
One final case amply exemplifies how the salience and conspicuousness of
unsuccessful lawsuits fosters a perception that administering unwanted life-sustaining
treatment entails little legal risk. In Grace Plaza of GreatNeck v. Elbaum, the nursing home
refused to follow instructions of the patient's spouse to remove the feeding tube. 264 Not
only was the spouse unable to sue for damages, but the court even allowed the nursing
home to recover payment for the treatment. 265 The spouse was financially responsible
266
for treatment that he had specifically and vehemently rejected.

Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1158 (Wash. 2007); see also Branom v. State, 974
P.2d 335, 338 (Wash. 1999) (holding no cause of action against neonatologist's care of severely
neurologically impaired infant son); Glasner v. Howick, No. 03A01-9612-CV-00401, 1997 WL
677955, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling for defendants where newborn was successfully
resuscitated against parents' wishes).
259 Stewart-Graves, 170 P.3d at 1154.
260 Id. at 1155.
261 Id. at 1154; see HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 762 (testifying physician stated "that to deny any
attempts at resuscitation without seeing the infant's condition would be inappropriate and below
the standard of care").
262 Stewart-Graves, 170 P.3d at 1154. The infant, being born without a heart rate and spontaneous
respiration, and with an Apgar score of zero, caused a code team to perform resuscitative efforts
for twenty-four minutes until a spontaneous heart rate occurred in the newborn. Id.
263 Id. at 1152. Disagreeing physicians may seek judicial intervention when confronted with a
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment, but have more immediate discretion
when in an emergency due to the gravity of the situation. Id.
264 Grace Plaza v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513, 514 (N.Y. 1993).
265 Id. at 516; see also George J. Annas, Adding Injustice to Injugy Compulsogy Paymentfor Unwanted
258

Treatment, 327 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1885 (1992).
266

Grace Plaza, 623 N.E.2d at 516.
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C. Legal Obstacles to Liability
In addition to both the availability of ex ante permission and the salience of

unsuccessful ex post cases for damages, clinicians think that administering unwanted
treatment entails little legal risk, because of five prominent obstacles to establishing
liability: (1) rejection of the "wrongful living" cause of action; (2) rejection of private
claims under the PSDA; (3) the emergency exception to informed consent; (4) safe
harbor legal immunity under healthcare decisions acts; and (5) conscience clauses. 267
1. Rejection of "Wrongful Living" Cause ofAction
Related to the salience of unsuccessful damages cases in general is the salience
of the nearly universal rejection of a legal theory for "wrongful living" or "wrongful
prolongation of life.' 268 The essence of this theory is that the claimed loss is the
prolongation of life itself.
It is useful to place the "wrongful living" theory in context. There are several
related causes of action. 269 First, "wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful conception"
asserts the negligence of the clinicians pertaining to the performance of the sterilization
procedure. 270 Second, "wrongful birth" is where the negligence of the clinician pertains
to the failure to diagnose a genetic defect. Had it been diagnosed the parents might
have either avoided conception or would not have continued the pregnancy. 271 Third,
"wrongful life" is where the child maintains an action that is the equivalent of the

There are, of course, other legal obstacles.

I focus here on those most reinforcing the
perception that administering unwanted, life-sustaining treatment entails little legal risk. Other
legal obstacles are far more formidable. For example, because of their reduced liberty, prisoners
often lose refusal of treatment cases. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Hume, No. CIV S-11-3441, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53382, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Sama v. Hannigan, 669 F.3d 585, 596 (5th Cir. 2012);
Lackey v. Hayes, No. CV 112-069, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153608, at *1 (S.D. Ga. 2012);
Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887, 889 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); see also Runnels v
Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1974) (overruling lower court in favor of inmate's claim of
lack of consent for hemorrhoidectomy).
268 KATHLEEN E. WHERTHEY, 16 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 83, at 5 10 (2001) ("[T]his theory is
largely experimental and courts generally have not been hospitable to it").
269 See Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tenn. 1987) (listing three causes of action in the
wrongful living context).
270 Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. 1991); Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. of
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ohio 1989).
271 See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1372; Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash.
1983).
267
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parent's wrongful birth action. 272 Most jurisdictions allow wrongful birth, but not
273
wrongful life.
Similarly, most jurisdictions that have confronted the question have rejected
"wrongful living" and "prolongation of life" as a distinct cause of action. Most
famously, the theory has been repeatedly rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court.274 But
"wrongful living" has also been rejected by appellate courts in Indiana, 275 New Jersey,2 76
Washington,

277

278
and other states.

These courts have rested the basis for their rejection on one or both of two
reasons. First, the courts concluded that continued life is necessarily a benefit, not
harm. 279 One cannot, therefore, have a cause of action premised on the prolongation of
life as the claimed "injury." 280 Second, even if wrongful prolongation were a legally
cognizable injury, it is incapable of quantification. 281 Life itself is not a compensable
damage.282
"'Wrongful living" seems to neatly capture the essence of the nonconsensual
administration of life-sustaining treatment. Therefore, its rejection seems tantamount to
283
rejection of any legal remedy regarding the right to refuse treatment.
Stewart-Graves v. Vaighn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Wash. 2007).
Milani, infra note 362, at 194-95.
274 See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E. 2d 225, 227-29; Allore v.
Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
275 Taylor v. Muncie Med. Investors, 727 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting claim
for "wrongful prolongation of life").
276 McGuinness v. Barnes, No. A-3457-94T5, slip op. at 8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6,
1996).
277 Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
278 See, e.g., Greco v. U.S., 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Nev. 1995); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d
1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988).
279 See, e.g., Greco, 893 P.2d at 348; Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1210.
280 See, e.g., Greco, 893 P.2d at 347-48; Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1210.
281 See, e.g., Greco, 893 P.2d at 347; Lininger,764 P.2d at 1210.
1983) (finding that human life is not a
282 Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d. 385, 389 (Ill.
compensable loss). In Cockrum, the Supreme Court of Illinois explained, "life should not be
outweighed by the expense of supporting it." Id. at 389.
283 judicial rejection of a "custom made" remedy does not mean that "stock" remedies are
unavailable. See discussion, infra Section V. This is not dissimilar from the legislative rejection of
hate crime bills. For example, an individual attacked because of his sexual orientation still has a
number of available civil and criminal remedies. Christian Herrmann, Chapter 98: Deterring Hate
Crimes and Eqforcing State and Federally Secured ConstitutionalRights, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 546, 552
(2000) ("Critics of hate crime legislation also argue that existing law sufficiently addresses violent
272
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2. Rejection of Private Claims under the PSDA
Like "wrongful living," the PSDA seems like a source of patient rights (and thus
clinician correlative duties) that is custom designed to address unwanted life-sustaining
treatment. Apart from its suggestive tide, one of the PSDA's key objectives is to
"ensure compliance with requirements of State law ... respecting advance directives at
facilities of the provider or organization." 284 Therefore, the judicial rejection of private
claims under the PSDA, 28s like the judicial rejection of "wrongful living," has a negative
symbolic value. It seems tantamount to a wholesale rejection of any legal remedy
regarding the right to refuse treatment.
3.

Emergeng Excplion

As illustrated by the Miller and Stewart-Graves cases, the emergency exception
seems to permit clinicians to treat patients without consent. 286 More precisely, the
patient must still consent to treatment. 287 In an emergency, the consent is "implied" by
the special circumstances. 288 When the patient is incapable of consenting and the harm
from a failure to treat is both serious and imminent, "it is settled that the impracticality
of conferring with the patient dispenses with need for it."289 In short, a health care
provider may deliver life-sustaining treatment "when neither the patient nor an
'290
appropriate agent can make the choice pro or con.

crime, thereby, making such legislation superfluous.").
284 Patient Self Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(D) (2006).
285 See, e.g., Turner v. Jackson Park Hosp., 264 Fed. Appx. 527 (7th Cir. 2008); Scheible v. Joseph
L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (finding "willful
disregard of [an] advance healthcare directive" was wrongful prolongation of life); Asselin v.
Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting PSDA
"requires that certain health care providers maintain written policies and procedures with respect
to all adult patients.").
286 See supra notes 249-66 and accompanying text.
287 HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. App. 2000) (explaining that Texas law gives
parents right to consent to child's treatment).
288

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 243-244 (esse

H. Chopper et al. eds., photo. reprint

2001) (2000) (concluding that it is "not impossible to believe that a patient undergoing an
operation consents by implication to extensions of the operation that become medically
desirable"). "The patient had impliedly consented to extensions of the operation as appeared
necessary in the doctor's medical judgment during the time the patient was incapacitated by
anesthesia." Id. at 248.
289 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
290 DOBBS, supranote 288, at 247.
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Indeed, the emergency exception has been successfully invoked in other cases
alleging unwanted treatment. Since a patient's need for life-sustaining treatment can
often be characterized as an "emergency," it might seem that the exception almost
automatically authorizes the administration of life-sustaining treatment independent of
and regardless of actual consent in any circumstance. In fact, the emergency exception
does have qualifications and limits.2 91 But the judicial application of the exception has
more salience than cases in which courts have refused to apply it.292
4.

Statutogy Safe HarborImmunity

Perhaps the most common reason that clinicians think that the risk of
administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment entails little legal risk, is because many
state health care decisions acts expressly grant them permission to deviate from patient
293
instructions.
For example, the Minnesota Health Care Directives Act provides that a health
care provider who "administers health care necessary to keep the principal alive, despite
a health care decision of the health care agent to withhold or withdraw that treatment, is
294
not subject to criminal prosecution, civil liability, or professional disciplinary action."

See infra notes 441-48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
293 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 36-3205(c)
(2009); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 15-18-113(5) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a (West
2011); D.C. CODE 5 7-627(b) (LexisNexis 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 765.1105(i) (West 2010);
HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §327E-7(g) (LexisNexis 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 144A.8 (West 2005);
KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 65- 2 8,107(a) (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.58.7(D) (Supp. 2013);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. 5 5-613(a) (LexisNexis 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. §459.030 (West
2007); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 50-9-203 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 449.628 (LexisNexis
2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 137-J:7(IV) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 26:2H-65(b) (West 2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 23-06.5-09(2) (Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9 (West. Supp.
2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 23-4.11-7 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-12D-11 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-101 (2007); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
291

292

CODE ANN. § 166.045 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-115(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 5 9707(c) (2012); VA. CODE ANN. 5 54.1-2987 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
154.07 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-408 (2011).
294 MINN. STAT.

§ 145C.11 (West 2011). The immunity is conditional. But the conditions are not

onerous. The provider must simply take all reasonable steps to:
(1) notify the health care agent of the health care provider's unwillingness to
comply; (2) document the notification in the principal's medical record; and (3)

permit the health care agent to arrange to transfer care of the principal to
another health care provider willing to comply with the decision of the health
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Similarly, Utah's POLST statute provides that a health care provider "is immune from
civil or criminal liability, and is not subject to discipline for unprofessional conduct, for.
. . providing life sustaining treatment to a person when a life with dignity order directs
that the life sustaining treatment be withheld or withdrawn. ' 295 Other states have
296
similar provisions.
When judicially tested, courts have upheld this statutory immunity. For
example, Martha Duarte suffered severe brain injury and was diagnosed as being in a
persistent vegetative state. 297 The family requested that Martha be removed from the
ventilator, but her health care providers refused. 298 The family filed suit but the jury
found for the defendants. 299 The appellate court affirmed, noting that the governing
statute grants immunity to a provider who refuses to comply.300
5. Consience Clauses
Often, the safe harbor immunity afforded by a state's health care decisions act
provides clinicians with two types of protection. Under these statutes, clinicians may
refuse to comply with treatment refusals not only for professional reasons, but also for
personal conscience-based reasons. 301 In addition, many states have separate and
independent conscience clauses that protect clinicians' rights to conscience-based
30 2
objection.

care agent.
Id.
295

UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-106(6)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).

See supra note 294.
Duarte v. Chino Comm. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
298 Id.
296
297

299
300

Id.
Id. at 524; see also Stolle v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 981 S.W.2d 709, 714 (Tex. App. 1998)

(holding clinicians immune under statute for providing life-sustaining treatment to brain-damaged

child against her parent's instructions).
See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734(a) (West 2009) ("A health care provider may decline to
comply with an individual health care instruction or health care decision for reasons of
conscience."); id. 5 4740(d) ("A health care provider ... is not subject to civil or criminal liability
or to discipline for ... [d]ecining to comply with an individual health care instruction or health
care decision, in accordance with Sectionj] 4734").
302 Seegeneraly Consience Clauses, supra note 206, at 172 (outlining the two main types of conscience
301

objection laws and approaches taken by numerous states).
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Healthcare Providers Have Been Increasingly Sanctioned for Administering
Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment

In the last Section, I showed that clinicians think there is little legal risk from
administering life-sustaining treatment without consent. In this Section, I demonstrate
that their perception is wrong. This is likely due to limitations in the published risk
assessment literature. These medical and law journal articles are based on a very limited
data set. 303 First, commentators base their assessment almost exclusively on courts cases
seeking civil damages. 30 4 Second, their court cases are outdated and unrepresentative.
A broader, more thorough and more up-to-date review indicates that the legal
risk is significant. 305 Health care providers have been increasingly subjected to civil
30 6
This is hardly the only
liability for administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
type of sanction imposed. Providers have also been subjected to disciplinary and
criminal sanctions for providing treatment without appropriate authorization. 307
Furthermore, recent developments indicate that the severity and frequency of such
This may be, as one legal
litigation and regulatory sanctions is increasing. 308
30 9
litigation."
healthcare
in
commentator observed, the "next frontier
A. Civil Liability
There is no space, here, to review all the potential theories of civil liability.
Accordingly, I focus on the ten most significant causes of action used to address the
administration of unwanted life-sustaining treatment. Many of these are tort-based: (1)
battery; (2) informed consent; (3) negligence; (4) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 310 Some of these causes of
Indeed, many legal commentators limit their focus not only to civil liability in general but even
specifically to claims framed as "wrongful life." See Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This
the Answer to the Wlrongful Lfe Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185 (1993); see also Peters, supra note
11.
See, e.g., Peters, supra note 11, at 718 ("[T]he threat of damages constitutes the most significant
304
legal sanction that physicians will realistically face for the violation of patient rights.").
305 See Pope, supra note 15, at 121-22. Just because the risk is significant does not necessarily
mean that it is sufficient to deter. Id. On the other hand, the perception of even low risk impacts
clinician behavior. Id. In any case, my primary objective is to demonstrate that the risk is greater
than that typically quantified in other assessments.
306 See infra discussion Part V.A.
307 See infra discussion Parts V.C., V.D.
308 See infra discussion Part V.C.3.
309 Parker, spra note 49 (quoting Florida State University law professor Lois Shepherd).
310 Peters, supra note 11, at 684. Plaintiffs have also pursued actions under other tort theories.
303
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action are based on (6) breach of contract. And some are based on statutes such as: (7)
health care decisions acts; (8) POLST statutes; (9) Section 1983; and (10) the False
Claims Act. 3" Finally, it is important to note (11) the collateral transaction costs
involved with litigation even in the absence of liability.
1. Battery
Battery is the most obvious legal theory that a plaintiff would use to recover
money damages for the administration of unwanted life-sustaining treatment. 3 12 It is a
simple tort with just two elements. The clinician is liable for battery, if: (1) he or she
"acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person" and (2) "a
313
harmful [or offensive] contact with person of the other directly or indirectly results."
Intent is broadly defined "to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his
act as well as the situation in which the defendant merely believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it."314

Medical battery is a well-established intentional tort. 315 Many still-cited United
States precedents date back over a century.3 16 And the elements have barely changed

See, e.g., Afentakis v. Memorial Hosp., 667 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (N.Y. 1997) (asserting right of
dignity violation); Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 59 (Mass. 1999) (claiming false imprisonment);
Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (seeking treatment by
Christian Science caused wrongful death); Carol J. Wessels, Treated with Respect: Enforcing Patient
Autonomy by Defending Advance Directives, 6 MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR 217, 240-41 (2003)
(noting abuse of process).
311 See infra Part V.A.7 - V.A.10. Plaintiffs have also pursued civil actions based on other statutes.
Seegeneraly MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, § 11.08[B] (collecting cases brought under eight
different kinds of statutes); Stolle v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 981 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. App. 1998)
(bringing claim under Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act); Hallada v.
Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 2103CA-002054 (Polk Cry. Cir. Ct., Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (alleging
claim under vulnerable adult statute).
312 See Pope & Anderson, supra note 20, at 402-07 (analyzing battery claims for unwanted
treatment); DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927 N.Y.S.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011), affirmed, inpart,
2011-08304, 2012 LEXIS 8613 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that "[a]dministering a
blood transfusion without informed consent is best characterized as a battery') (citing Salandy v.
Bryk, 864 N.Y.S.2d 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)).
313 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
314 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS

§ 13 (1965).
§ 8A (1965).

315 Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) (stating unauthorized medical treatment
constitutes battery); Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
(characterizing medical operation without patient consent as battery).
316 See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla.
1913); Schloendorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
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over the past 100 years. These are illustrated in the following colloquy in the Cruzan
case before the U.S. Supreme Court:
Justice O'Connor: Was the family's consent required at the time for
the insertion of the tube? . . . If they had refused that permission,
would the state law have required that refusal to be honored?
Mr. Colby: The family's consent was required for the surgery to insert
the tube.... It would have been a battery for the doctor to perform a
317
surgery without consent.
In short, a battery is established when the clinician acts without any consent
whatsoever. And a battery is also established when the clinician acts outside the scope
318
of the patient's consent, whether spatially, temporally, or otherwise.
319
It does not matter how skillfully or successfully the intervention is provided.

Oral Argument at 2:59, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (No. 88-1503),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989-88_1503.
317

318

See, e.g., Scholendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (addressing patient

consented to biopsy, not surgery); Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859 (La. 1983) (addressing
patient consented to exploratory surgery, not removal of reproductive organs); Perna v. Pirozzi,
457 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1983) (consenting to operation with only one specific doctor); Paulsen v.
Gunderson, 260 N.W. 448 (Wis. 1935) (analyzing patient consent to a "simple" ear operation,
and instead underwent a "radical" ear operation); Franklyn v. Peabody, 228 N.W. 681 (Mich.
1930) (operating on thumb without consent); Gill v. Selling, 267 P. 812 (Ore. 1928) (performing
spinal puncture on wrong patient), overruled by Fredeen v. Stride, 525 P.2d 166 (Ore. 1974); Hively
v. Higgs, 253 P. 363 (Ore. 1927) (noting removal of tonsils during septum operation); Hershey v.
Peake, 223 P. 1113 (Kan. 1924) (concerning wrong tooth); Throne v. Wandell, 186 N.W. 146
(Wis. 1922) (addressing patient consent to examination, not extraction of six teeth); Moos v. U.S.,
225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955) (operating on wrong leg); Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (operating on wrong spinal disk); Perry v. Shaw, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70, 72

(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning patient consent to removal of excess skin, not breast
augmentation); Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (analyzing patient
imposed condition on consent); Bommareddy v. Superior Ct., 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (concerning patient agreed to tear duct surgery, not cataract extraction); Lane v. U.S., 225
F. Supp 850 (E.D. Va. 1964) (addressing surgery on wrong knee); Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal
of Liabilityfor UnauthorizedMedical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957).
319 See, e.g., Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15 (requiring consent in non-emergency situations), overruled in part
b Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
892, illus. 1, at 435 (1965); see also Montgomery v. Bazaz-Seghal, 742 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999), affd, 798 A.2d 742 (Pa. 2002) (discussing urologist implanted penile prosthesis without
patient's knowledge or consent); Taylor v. Johnston, 985 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1999) (obtaining
patient consent by fraud); Millard v. Nagle, 587 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1991) (seeking damages for
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It does not matter that the administration of treatment is beneficial on balance. 320 Nor
does it matter if the clinician's intent was to benefit the patient. 321 Whether that

unauthorized surgery despite physician intention); Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 439 (N.J. 1983)
("A nonconsensual operation remains a battery even if performed skillfully and to the benefit of
the patient."); Pugsley v. Privette, 263 S.E.2d 69 (Va. 1980) (holding that unconsented medical
treatment constitutes a battery, even though such medical treatment may be beneficial to the
plaintiff); Rogers v. Lumbersmens Mut. Casualty Co., 119 So. 2d 649 (La. 1960); Genzel v.
Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957) (performing surgery without consent is battery);
Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1956) (analyzing causation between doctor's action and
patient's harms in battery action); Franklyn v. Peabody, 228 N.W. 681 (Mich. 1930) (operating on
patient's right thigh without consent to obtain tissue for a procedure on patient's thumb
constitutes battery); Perry v. Hodgsen, 148 S.E. 659 (Ga. 1929) (noting patient consent required
unless emergency); Barrette v. Lopez, 725 N.E.2d 314 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing
medical negligence from battery); Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding physician not liable for patient's refusal to consent); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188,
199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (remanding for damages even though surgery somewhat beneficial);
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("A physician who
treats a patient without consent commits a battery, even though the procedure is harmless or
beneficial."); Mims v. Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (recognizing physician
treatment without consent is guilty of technical battery); McCandless v. State, 162 N.Y.S.2d 570
(N.Y. App. Div. 1957) (affirming $2,000 in damages even though procedure less harmful and
App. Ct. 1953)
improved patient's mental health); Church v. Adler, 113 N.E.2d 327 (Ill.
(reviewing cause of medical negligence); Mulloy v. Hop Sang, 1 W.W.R. 714 (Can. A.R. 1935)
(holding that even a successful operation, contrary to patient instructions, was still a battery).
320 DOBBS, supra note 288, at 80 ("Even beneficial touchings such as medical procedures may
warrant damages if they are batteries."). The Second Restatement of Torts provides an applicable
example:
A has a wart on his neck. His physician, B, advises him to submit to an
operation for its removal. A refuses to do so. Later A consents to another
operation ....B removes the wart. The removal in no way affects A's health,
and is in fact beneficial. A has suffered bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15, illus. 1 (1965).
321 MEISEL& CERMINARA, supra note 25, at § 2-24 n.104; Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (concerning lack of consent for spinal anesthesia); Corn v. French, 289
P.2d 173 (Nev. 1955) (alleging mastectomy without consent); Woodson v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199
(Okla. 1953) (affirming need for consent to give anesthesia); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474
(Ky. Ct. App. 1952) (addressing removal of fallopian tubes during operation for appendicitis);
Williams, 104 N.W. at 15-16 (discussing operation on left ear but consent obtained only for right
ear), overruled inpart by Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957); Rolater v. Strain, 137
P. 96 (Okla. 1913) (addressing removal of sesamoid bone without consent); Hively v. Higgs, 253
P. 363 (Or. 1927) (addressing removal of tonsils with only consent for septum surgery); Wells v.
Van Nort, 125 N.E. 910 (Ohio 1919) (analyzing physician decision to remove fallopian tubes);
Schloendorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (addressing unauthorized surgery),
abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Sekerez v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 954 N.E.2d
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treatment constitutes a "benefit" is a value judgment for the patient to make. The
clinician knows that intervention is harmful. Many of these procedures are "highly
intrusive, and some are violent in nature. 3 22 Or the clinician at least knows that,
without consent, the treatment would be offensive, infringing on reasonable sense of
personal dignity. 323 In short, neither "good" motives nor "good" results are relevant to
324
a finding of battery.
A cause of action for battery is particularly attractive to a plaintiff. First, she
does not need to establish a standard of care. 325
retain any expert witnesses.

326

Consequently, she does not need to

Second, while the plaintiff likely will be able to prove

383 (11.
App. Ct. 2011) (reversing directed verdict for defendants who administered Lovenox to
terminally ill cancer patient against his stated and documented wishes); Gragg v. Calandra, 696
N.E.2d 1282, 1290 (IlI. App. Ct. 1998) ("Although a defendant may reasonably believe that his
objective is legitimate, it does not provide him with carte blanche to pursue that objective by
outrageous means."); Kaplan v. Blank, 419 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (claiming lack of
written consent for tubal ligation); Markart v. Zeimer, 227 P. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (reviewing
negligence in hernia surgery).
322 In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (Mass. App. 1978); see also MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 25, § 6.02 (collecting cases); see Markart v. Zeimer, 227 P. 683 (Cal. App. 1924)
(concerning removal of testicle).
323 DOBBS, supra note 288, § 33, at 81 ("It is enough that the defendant intends bodily contact
that is 'offensive,' which is to say a bodily contact that does not appear acceptable to the
plaintiff."); Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battey: Confusion and Controvery, 61 AM.
U. L. REv. 1585, 1595 (2012); HORACE, ARS POETICA 467 (Transl. A.S. Kline 2005) ("[W]ho
saves one, against his will, murders him").
324 Moore, supra note 323, at 1611, 1621; Curtis v. Jaskey, 326 Ill.
App. 3d 90, 94 (2001) (noting
that it is unnecessary for plaintiff to prove defendant physician had hostile intent); McNeil v.
App. 3d 1050, 1154-55 (1999).
Brewer, 304 Ill.
325 DOBBS, supra note 288, at 342 ("Even beneficial ...
medical procedures warrant damages if
they are batteries."). "A person is entitled to refuse well-intentioned medical treatment." Id.§ 29,
at 54; see Urlaub v. Select Specialty Hosp. Memphis, No. W2010-00732-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
255281 1, 6 (Tenn App. Jan. 20, 2011) (administering dialysis contrary to instructions could
constitute a battery by not following the standard of care necessitated by informed consent);
1978); Beane v. Perley, 109 A.2d 848, 850
Mink v. Univ. Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Ill.
(N.H. 1954) (recognizing the difficulty in providing medical expert testimony as required in
malpractice suits). But see Pleasure v. Louisiana Organ Procurement Ass'n, 83 So. 3d 174 (La.
App. 2011) (affirming judgment that continuing life-support and removing organs without
While the
consent sounded in medical malpractice), rev. denied, 85 So. 3d 1248 (La. 2012).
conferral of "benefit" by the unwanted treatment does not effect the cause of action, it is
considered in determining the amount of the award. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER,
JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS 348 (3d ed. 2006). Nevertheless, it is problematic to characterize as
a "benefit" a state of life the person living that life finds intolerable.
326 As litigation costs decrease, clinician compliance rates should rise. Keith N. Hylton, Litigation
Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard,22 J. LEG. STUDIES 457, 459 (1993).
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damages she does not need to establish any. 327 She can recover nominal and punitive
damages without showing any compensatory damages. 328 Third, she need not navigate
tort reform procedural hurdles such as damages caps and pre-filing review. 329 Fourth,
the prospect of damages sends a very powerful signal, because a judgment or settlement
may not be covered by insurance. 330
Perhaps the most notable battery lawsuit over the administration of unwanted
life-sustaining treatment involved Brenda Young. In 1996, a Michigan jury awarded
$16.5 million for keeping Brenda on life support for over two months. 33 1 This amount
included the patient's pain and suffering, the mother's mental anguish, a sister's mental
anguish, and future medical expenses.
332
million, and the case was later settled.

The trial court reduced this amount to $1.4

DOBBS, supra note 288, at § 42, at 79 ("When the trespassory tort causes no physical harm, the
traditional tort rule is that the plaintiff can nevertheless recover substantial as distinct from
nominal damages .... The invasion of the plaintiff's rights is regarded as harm in itself.. . ."); id.
§ 100, at 234 n.17 ("The difference is that a battery is actionable without proof of bodily harm or
economic loss; the offensive touching is harm in itself."); id. § 28, at 54 ("Battery today vindicates
the plaintiff's rights of autonomy and self-determination, her right to decide for herself how her
body will be treated by others"); B v. NHS Hosp. Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (awarding C100
nominal damages).
328 See, e.g., Whitley-Woodford v. Jones, 600 A.2d 946, 947-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(noting that an operation undertaken without consent, even if perfectly performed with good
medical results, may entitle the plaintiff to at least nominal damages and even punitive damages).
329 This has been confirmed in battery cases involving life-sustaining treatment.
See generaly
327

RICHARD E. SHANDELL & PATRICIA SMITH, THE PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE CASES § 1.06[6] (2006); Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Il. App.
1998); Russell v. Murphy, 86 S.W.3d 745, 748-50 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding medical standards
irrelevant where anesthesiologist administered sedative despite patient's specific request for local
anesthetic); Jones v. Ruston La. Hosp. Co., 71 So. 3d 1154 (La. App. 2011) (holding Medical
Malpractice Act and review by "medical review panel" inapplicable where clinician resuscitated
Agnes Liles despite "knowledge of the DNR order"); Abeyta v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., No.
M2011-02254-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5266321 (Tenn. App. Oct. 24, 2012) (having not filed a
certificate of good faith did not amount to malpractice, but ordinary negligence, not requiring
expert testimony). But cf Shuler v. McGrew, No. 12-2003-STA-dkv, 2012 WL 3260685 1, 6
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding that administration of Heparin over patient's objections was
not battery because it was a "component part of the treatment process" and providers had
patient's consent to be treated at the hospital).
330 HARPER ET AL., supra note 325, § 3.10, at 351.
331 Osgood v. Genesys Regional Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee Cry. Cir. Ct., Mich. Mar.
7, 1997). While reversed on appeal, the Millers' $60 million verdict against HCA is still notable.
See supra note 254.
332 Osgood v. Genesys Regional Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Genesee Cry. Cir. Ct., Mich. Feb.
16, 1996); Rodriguez, supranote 11, at 31.
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The Brenda Young case is not unique. Other plaintiffs have also recovered
damages in battery actions. For example, in Lunsford v. UCSF Medical Center, a San
Francisco jury awarded $500,000 to the parents of a child transfused against parental
wishes. 333 Similarly, in Malette v. Shulman, the court upheld an award of $20,000 where
the patient "suffered mentally and emotionally" from getting a blood transfusion
contrary to her written instructions. 334 And in Leach v. Shapiro, clinicians refused a
guardian's request to remove the ventilator from his wife who was in a persistent
vegetative state. 335 The hospital settled for $50,000.336
In 2011, the Louisiana Court of Appeals permitted a battery claim to proceed. 337
The patient's daughters had sued the hospital for its failure to abide the patient's DNR
order. The daughters alleged that despite knowledge of the DNR order, hospital
employees resuscitated their father, who suffered physical limitations and disabilities
requiring rehabilitation until his ultimate death two months later. The case is now in
discovery. 338 The daughters are seeking damages for the medical expenses attributable
to his post-resuscitation care, physical and mental pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment
of life, and cognitive decline.
2.

Informed Consent

While battery concerns the administration of treatment without consent, an
informed consent cause of action presumes that the patient actually did consent to the
treatment. 339 In an informed consent action, the patient concedes that she consented. 340

333 No. 837936 (San Francisco Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1990); Steven A. Chin, Famiy of Blood Recipient

Wins $500,000, SAN FRANcisco EXAMINER, Apr. 20, 1990, available at
http://www.deseretnews.com/artice/98173/FAMILY-OF-BLOOD-RECIPIENT-WINS500000.html?pg=all. Although overturned by post-trial motions and affirmed on appeal, the case
was settled for an amount in excess of six figures. The McCabe Law Firm, APC,
http://www.mccabelaw.net/docs/cv.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
314 Malette v. Shulman (1990), 72 O.R. 2d 417 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
335 Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
336 Vicki Joiner Bowers, Comment, Advance Directives: Peace of Mind or False Securiy?, 26 STETSON
L. REv. 677, 702 n.138 (1996).
337 Jones v. Ruston La. Hosp. Co., 71 So. 3d 1154, 1157 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
338 E-mail from Kurt S. Blankenship, Partner, Blue Williams, LLP, to Professor Thaddeus M.
Pope, Director of the Health Law Institute and Associate Professor, Hamline University School
of Law (Dec. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
339 See Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1052 (discussing informed consent requirement for treatment).
"There is no legal defense to battery based on consent if a patient's consent to touching is given
without sufficient knowledge and understanding the nature of the touching." Id.
340 See id. at 1054 (discussing ramifications of failure to disclose material information about
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But the patient argues that she would not have consented had the clinician disclosed
relevant information that the clinician had a legal duty to disclose. 341 Sometimes, the
clinician's failure to obtain adequate informed consent is deliberate. For example, the
clinician might intentionally distort the patient's prognosis to get consent. 342 More
343
commonly, the clinician's failure to obtain informed consent is inadvertent.
Traditionally, informed consent actions have been a form of medical
negligence. 344 But, increasingly, states have been enacting statutes that specifically
mandate clinicians to disclose end-of-life treatment options. 345 California, for example,
provides that when a health care provider makes a diagnosis that a patient has a terminal
illness, the provider "shall, upon the patient's request, provide the patient with
'346
comprehensive information and counseling regarding legal end-of-life care options.

patient's condition). Where plaintiffs acting on patient's behalf were not fully informed of the
patient's condition during two months of treatment, the court acknowledged that a failure to
disclose material information of a patient's condition may be actionable even if consent was
given. Id.
341 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("It is
incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical petitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that
someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure ....");HARPER ET AL., supra note 325, §
17.1, at 627 ("The very foundation of the doctrine is everyone's right to forgo treatment or even
cure if it entails whatfor him are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or perverted
his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession ....
").
342 Billings, supra note 50, at 597; Helen Harrison, The Offer They Can't Refuse: Parents and Perinatal
Treatment Decisions, 13 SEMINARS FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 329 (2008); JAMES L.BERNAT,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 172 (3d ed. 2008). The line between a strong recommendation

and coercion at times may be hard to draw; "Physicians should not threaten patients or
surrogates, [and] not exaggerate facts .... Id.(footnote omitted); see also Marshall v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, No. 11C100972 (27th Jud. Cir. Ct., Ky. Sept. 11, 2011) (alleging a number of
medical providers performed unnecessary heart procedures).
343It is difficult to establish causation in informed consent cases because the plaintiff must
establish that, with disclosure, a reasonable person would not have consented to the treatment.
This can be especially challenging in life- saving cases. See, e.g., PatientLoses Suit Against Doctor Who
Saved His Lfe, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1996, at A20, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-0709/news/mn-22442 1_tracheotomy (suggesting the jury concluded that the patient changed his
mind).
344DOBBS, supra note 288, at 654.
341See statutes cited supra note 190.

Other states have been exploring similar legislation. See, e.g.,
S.B. 1447, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (listing end-of-life options for terminally ill
patients); S.B. 1298, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (listing end-of-life options for
terminally ill patients in healthcare institutions); H.B. 30, 249th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009)
(urging Attorney General to convene work group to make recommendations for end-of life care).
346 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 442.5 (2009); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text
on similar statutes.
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This crystallizes the clinician's duty in this way should make it easier to enforce. 347
3.

Negligence

If the clinician is unaware of the patient's advance directive or other refusal,
then the plaintiff probably cannot establish the requisite intent for battery. 348 But the
patient might still be able to establish negligence. In order to establish that a clinician
negligently failed to comply with a refusal of treatment, the plaintiff must show: (1) that
the clinician had a duty to care for the patient in accord with her expressed preferences;
(2) that the clinician breached that duty, deviating from the relevant standard of care; (3)
that the patient suffered damages; and (4) that those damages were caused by the
349
breach.
The clinician's ignorance of the patient's instructions may be negligence.350 For
example, in Anderson v. St. Francis/St.Geore Hosp., when 82-year-old Edward Winter was
admitted to the hospital for cardiac insufficiency, he authorized his family physician to
enter a "no code blue" in his chart. 351 Just a few days later, Mr. Winter had an episode
of a type of irregular heart rhythm. 352 A hospital nurse, apparently unaware of the "no
code blue" order, resuscitated Mr. Winter by defibrillation. 3 3 While the nurse is unlikely
to be personally liable for battery, 354 the court noted that Mr. Winter's battery and
negligence claims were valid (presumably against the facility).355 Winter's medical

See, e.g., Hargett v. Vitas Healthcare Corp., No. RG10547255 (Alameda Cry. Super. Ct., Cal.
filed July 6, 2011).
348 DOBBS, supra note 288, 5 28, at 53 ("An accidental touching may count as negligence, but it is
not a battery."); Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). Cf. Hulver v.
U.S., 393 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Gaskin v. Goldwasser, 520 N.E.2d 1085 (I11. App. Ct.
1988); Hogan v. Morgan, 960 So. 2d 1024 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Wooley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d
1123 (Me. 1980); Moore, supra note 323, at nn.321-32.
349 WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
350 See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 614 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(claiming undesired resuscitation of patient was negligence that prevented natural death). The
claim for negligence was premised on the failure to properly record the DNR order. David
Margolick, Patient'sLawsuit Says Saving Life Ruined It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/18/us/patient-s-lawsuit-says-saving-life-ruined-it.html.
351 Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843.
347

352

Id.

353

Id.

See Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 564-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (explaining
affirmation of summary judgment on issue of negligence).
355 Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 844.
354
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directives "were ignored, either negligently or intentionally." 35 6
Other theories of negligence have focused on providers' failure to consult the
patient's reasonably available surrogate.357 At the facility level, plaintiffs have focused on
providers' failure to draft, adopt, or implement adequate policies to elicit, record, and
convey patients' treatment preferences.35 8 Furthermore, the negligence per se doctrine
may also be applied based upon violations of relevant statutes, regulations, and
35
ordinances. 9

When an incapacitated patient has no documented refusal of treatment, then the
clinician who later administers such treatment may not be personally culpable for
361
360
The clinician did not even know about the refusal.
overriding the patient's refusal.
On the other hand, ignorance is not bliss. The clinician may be negligent for failing to
consult or examine the patient's medical records. 362 And it is probable that the facility is
363
negligent for failing to properly maintain medical records.
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 15, 1995).
357See, e.g., Complaint, Noval v. Kaiser Fdn. Hosp., No. RIC-1201608 (Riverside Cry. Super. Ct.,
Cal., filed Feb. 2, 2012); Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa App. 1987).
358 See, e.g., Kranson v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 48-49 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Self
v. Milyard, No. 11-CV-00813-RBJ-CBS, 2012 WL 1602104 (D. Colo. 2012); Callison v. Hillcrest
Healthcare System, No. CJ-2010-319, 2011 WL 7990001 (D. Okla. 2011); Clark v. Perry, 442
S.E.2d 57 (N.C. App. 1994); Marasovic v. Eberhard, No. A106356 , 2006 WL 367349 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2006); Furlong v. Catholic Healthcare West, No. B172067, 2004 WL 2958274 (Cal.
App. Dec. 22, 2004); Hallada v. Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 2103CA-002054 (Polk Cry. Cir. Ct.,
Fla. Apr. 1, 2013) (Complaint).
359 Cf Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 672-73 (Tenn. 2006). Several applicable health care
facility standards might support such a cause of action. See infra Sections V.A.7 & V.C.
360 Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (declining to find
physicians negligent for resuscitating patient when no evidence of DNR in chart); Wright v.
Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 176 (Md. 1999) (upholding summary judgment
for physicians because patient's oral directive declining resuscitation not in medical records).
361 R. Sean Morrison et al., The Inaccessibilio ofAdvance Directives on Transferfrom Ambulatoy to Acute
Care Sellings, 274 JAMA 478, 480 (1995) (finding advance directives documented in only 26% of
charts); Cynthia J. Stolman et al., Evaluation of Patient, Physidan, Nurse, and Famiy Attitudes toward
Do Not Resuscitate Orders, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 653, 653 (1990) (stating only 26% of
advanced directives are recognized).
362 See Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a Wrongul Living"
Cause ofAction Wlhen Doctors Failto Honor Patients'Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149,
225 n.355 (1997) (collecting cases where failure to examine records was negligent); c McVey v.
Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d 450, 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (declining physician
liability for failure to honor undocumented oral request to terminate patient's life support).
363 See A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of
356
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IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("lIED") has four
elements: (1) the defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; (2) his or her conduct
must be extreme and outrageous; and (3) the conduct must be the cause-in-fact (4) of
plaintiff's severe emotional distress. 364 Conduct is deemed "extreme and outrageous" if
it is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
365
community."
Early IIED cases over unwanted treatment were often unsuccessful, because
"ethical and legal norms concerning a patient's right to terminate life-preserving
treatment were [still] uncertain." 366 Consequently, courts were "less likely to find the
conduct of defendant health care providers to be extreme or outrageous. "367 For
example, in one of the earliest reported cases, the court took into account the "uncertain
medical and legal climate" to conclude that the defendant's conduct was not extreme or
outrageous.

368

In contrast, statutory and common law in this area is now both clear and wellestablished. 369 Today, it is, therefore, far easier to show that a clinician's acts in
Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 661 n.160 (1986) ("The responsibility of knowing the contents of a
patient's medical records should not be an undue burden for hospital medical personnel."); see
infra notes 449, 483-495 and accompanying text (reviewing facility inspections and citations for
inadequate record maintenance pertaining to end-of-life decisions).
364 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
365 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
366 Wherthey, supra note 230, § 5.
367 Id.
368 Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
medical professionals acted in reliance on what they believed to be "prevailing community"
standards). In Battling, the court explained that it "cannot agree that the Bartlings' rights were sowell defined at the time of Mr. Bartling's hospitalization that [hospital] acted with 'conscious
disregard' . . . ." Id. at 363; see also Foster v. Tourtellote, 704 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1983)
(observing that "the government faced a complete absence of helpful precedent"); Ross v.
Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1534-35 (D. Colo. 1987) ("[c]louded area of the law");
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l. Hosp., 507 A.2d 718, 723-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986) (reversing $140,000 verdict for NIED; but, remanding for new trial); Grace Plaza of Great
Neck v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). "[U]nder the law as it stood at
the time this case arose, [the long term care facility] committed no legal wrong... in the absence
of judicial guidance ...

."

Id. at 860.

See supra Section II. In this instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes was right: legal standards do
become clearer over time. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 111-29 (1881).

369
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providing unwanted treatment are extreme and outrageous. 370 For example, in Campbell
v. Delbridge, the court reversed summary judgment that the trial court had granted in
favor of a clinician and hospital that had transfused a Jehovah's Witness against her
37
wishes. 1
In Gragg v. Calanda, the patient underwent open-heart surgery and was placed on
life support contrary to his advance directive. 372 Moreover, the clinicians not only
contradicted the patient's instructions, but also abused and insulted family members,
"accusing them in a public area" of trying to kill the patient. 373 The clinician knew or
had reason to know that the family members were "extremely distraught" because of the
patient's condition. 374 The court concluded there was a "high probability" that severe
'3 s
emotional distress would follow and that the clinician "consciously disregarded it. "
Emboldened by this favorable precedent, plaintiffs continue to assert IIED
claims when clinicians administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment. For example, the
leading end-of-life advocacy organization, Compassion & Choices, recently filed
DeArmond v. Permanente Medical Group.376 Emily DeArmond had been ill her entire life
due to brain cancer. 377 In August 2010, her mother completed a POLST ordering "Do
Not Intubate." 378 A few weeks later, in November 2010, Emily's mother found her in
bed unresponsive. 37 9 An ambulance transported Emily to Kaiser Medical Center, where
30
an emergency room physician intubated Emily despite the POLST.
Emily's family filed a lawsuit for damages in the Superior Court of Orange
County, California, alleging causes of action for, among other things, intentional
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, at ch. 11 § 11.01 [A]. But see Westhart v. Mule, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing TIED claim because wife took no action to have her
husband's tube removed).
371 Campbell v. Delbridge, 670 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 2003); see also DiGeronimo, 927 N.Y.S.2d at
908 (suggesting that Jehovah Witness plaintiff should have plead TIED).
372 Gragg v. Calanda, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
373 Id. at 1289.
374 Id. at 1290.
370

375Id.

Complaint at 1, DeArmond v. Permanente Med. Group, No. 30-2011-00520263 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://thaddeuspope.com/images/DeArmondOCSC_11-0311complaint.pdf (alleging TIED on plaintiff by defendant doctor when he administered
unwanted end of life treatment to plaintiff's now deceased daughter).
377 Id. at 7.
376

378 Id.

at 8.

379 Id. at
380

Id.
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381
In May
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
382
While
2012, the court granted Kaiser's petition to compel arbitration of the dispute.
the DeArmond family may still prevail on the merits, it will be without the publicity or
383
transparency that normally attends litigation.

5. Negligent Infliction of EmotionalDistress
Even if a plaintiff cannot establish the elements of IIED, she might still be able
to establish the less demanding elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress
("NIED"). NIED requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) that the defendant engaged in
conduct that she should have realized involved an unreasonable risk of causing
384
emotional distress; and (2) that the conduct caused emotional distress to the plaintiff.

Either the patient or her family member could bring a claim for NIED. The
patient could maintain an action for NIED arising out of fear for her own personal

Id.at 10. The complaint also alleged: (1) neglect of a dependent adult; (2) deceptive and unfair
trade practices; (3) violation of the Health Care Decisions Act; and (4) violation of the California
Consumer Legal Remedies Act. DeArmond, No. 30-2011-00520263 at 36-38.
382 Civil CaseAccess, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE,
https://ocapps.occourts.org/civilwebShopping/ShowCase.do#top (last visited Apr. 30, 2013)
(case activity listed under Register of Actions).
383 The DeArmond case illustrates a broader phenomenon. Many hospitals and long-term care
facilities have mandatory pre-treatment arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Adam S. Levine, I Need a
Lawyer to See My Doctor: Pre-Treatment Mandatogy Arbitration Agreements as a Condition Precedent to
381

Receiving MedicalCare in Florida,7(2) ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Oct. 2010),

https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/pubications/aba-health -esource -home/Volume7_02
_levine.html. This reduces the visibility of claims for unwanted treatment. But it does not mean
that there are no settlements and awards. Plaintiffs' attorneys normally will not take medical
malpractice cases valued under $250,000. See Joanna Shepherd, Juslice in Crisis: Victim Access to the
American Medical i'ability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2147915##. That means injured
individuals effectively lose their access to court. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical
Ma oractice Litgation and Tort Reform: It's the Incenlives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1102 (2006).
But plaintiffs are still likely to bring IIED cases. First, they may be simpler and cheaper to try.
Second, some plaintiffs may even pay by the hour. Third, plaintiffs often bring lawsuits where
transaction costs exceed expected monetary recovery. See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,
Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla.
1958); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835). Fourth, even if there were insufficient incentives
to bring most unwanted treatment cases, that would not be different from medical malpractice.
Most medical errors of all types do not get litigated. But this hardly means that the medical
malpractice system exerts no deterrent signal or quality incentive.
384 Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816-18 (Cal. 1980).
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safety as a result of the defendant's negligent act. 385 In addition, with the widespread
abolition of the "impact rule," the patient's family member could maintain an NIED
action in the capacity of a bystander who witnesses or observes the negligent infliction
386
of tortious injury upon their family member.
For example, in O'Connell v. Bridgeport Hospital, the patient had authorized his
387
wife to effectuate his wishes regarding the withholding and removal of life support.
But hospital providers removed the patient's life support without notifying the wife or
obtaining her consent. 388 They should have, the wife alleged, known that those actions
created an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress. 389 The Connecticut Superior
Court ruled that the wife adequately stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

390

6.

Breach of Contract

Breach of contract claims are not commonly brought against health care
providers. "Considering the uncertainties of medical science and the variations in the
physical and psychological conditions of individual patients, doctors can seldom in good
faith promise specific results." 391 But they sometimes do make such promises, for
example, a guarantee to make a patient's injured hand a "one hundred percent good
393
hand." 392 And those promises can support a breach of contract action.

See, e.g., Ess v. Eskaton Props., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272,
283 (Ind.2000); Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ind.2000) (holding that "there may well
be circumstances where, while the plaintiff does not sustain a direct impact, the plaintiff is
sufficiently directly involved in the incident giving rise to the emotional trauma that we are able
to distinguish legitimate claims from the mere spurious"); Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa.
D. & C.4th 57 (1995).
387 O'Connell v. Bridgeport Hospital, No. CV 990362525, 2000 WL 157814, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 27, 2000).
388 Id.
385
386

389

Id.

Id; see also Hallada v. Lakeland Reg. Med. Ctr., No. 2103CA-002054 (Polk Cty. Cir. Ct., Fla.
Apr. 1, 2013) (Complaint) (asserting claim for NIED for failing to record DNR order).
391 Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973). The court upheld a jury verdict for
breach of contract where defendant promised to "perform plastic surgery on [plaintiff's] nose
and thereby to enhance her beauty and improve her appearance. Id. at 184.
392Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929); see also Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678,
682-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (clinician promised not to use cadaver bone in back
surgery).
393Murphy, 920 A.2d at 689
390
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In two recent cases, plaintiffs successfully brought breach of contract actions
against clinicians who administered unwanted treatment. In Russell v. Mupy, an
anesthesiologist administered a sedative despite both the patients' specific request for a
local anesthetic and the anesthesiologist's representation that no sedative would be
used. 394 Similarly, in Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic, a surgeon promised not to perform a Whipple
procedure until after first performing an inter-operative biopsy to confirm the pancreatic
cancer diagnosis. 395 But the agreed biopsy was never performed. 396 It would have
397
shown that the patient was cancer-free and did not need the Whipple.
But perhaps the most notable breach of contract case for unwanted treatment is
Schieble v. Joseph L Morse Geriatric Center.398 In 1992, when she moved into a Florida
nursing home at age 89, Madeline Neumann signed an advance directive instructing
providers not to revive her if she collapsed. 399 Three years later, on October 17, 1995, a
nurse at the Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Center found Ms. Neumann unresponsive on the
floor of her room. 400 Despite Ms. Neumann's written instructions, the nurse summoned
paramedics who attempted to revive Ms. Neumann and transported her to the
hospital. 40 1 Ms. Neumann ended up intubated and restrained. 4°2 This was precisely the
situation that she had hoped to avoid through her advance directive. 4°3 At the family's
request, hospital clinicians disconnected life support a few days later. 404 The jury
awarded $150,000 on the breach of contract claim. 405 The theory was that the advance
406
directive was incorporated into the resident's nursing home contract.

394 Russell v. Murphy, 86 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
395 Kaplan v. Mayo Clinic, 653 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2011).
396 Id. at 727.
397 Id. at 728.

Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr, 988 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529 (S.C. 2002) (reversing summary judgment where physician
told patient that it "wouldn't be necessary for the blood transfusion"); DiGeronimo v. Fuchs, 927
N.Y.S.2d 904, 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (suggesting that Jehovah Witness plaintiff should have
plead breach of contract).
399 Scheible, 988 So. 2d at 1131.
398

400

Id. at 1131-32

401 Id.
402

Id.

403 Id.
404 Scheible, 988 So. 2d at 1132.
405 Id.
406

Id. at 1133.

2013

JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW

7.

HealthcareDecisionsActs

Every state has a health care decisions act that protects patients' current and
prospective autonomy by providing for advance directives, healthcare agents, and
default surrogates. 407 Clinicians must ordinarily comply with decisions and instructions
made through these mechanisms. Intentionally violating this obligation subjects the
provider to $2,500 or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's
fees. 4a08 Several courts have specifically noted the availability of a statutory cause of
409
action for unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
Furthermore, even when a state health care decisions act fails to expressly
provide for a cause of action, the statute can probably still be used to establish
negligence per se. 410 When a statute provides that under certain circumstances particular
acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard of care from
which it is negligence to deviate. 411 "Consequently, a violation of the statute may be

Castillo et al., supra note 68; MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25; Resources & Research,
ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND AGING, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/law-aging/
resources.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). A handful of states do not statutorily authorize
default surrogates.
408 Id.; CAL. PROB. CODE § 4742(a) (2009). Furthermore, the specified damages are "cumulative
and not exclusive of any other remedies provided by law." Id. § 4742(c); see also MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-221(1) (2007) ("A health-care provider or institution that intentionally violates [this
act] is subject to liability to the aggrieved individual for damages of ...$500.00 or actual damages
resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees."); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7A-10(A) (2006) (mandating $5,000 or actual damages, plus reasonable attorney fees);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5608(a) (2010) ("Any person who without reasonable cause fails to comply
with [an agent's] instructions shall be subject to civil liability for any damages resulting from
noncompliance."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-411(a) (mandating $500 or actual damages, plus
reasonable attorney's fees).
409 See, e.g., Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 889 (11.App. Ct. 1996) (discussing
cause of action under Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act); Taylor v. Muncie Med. Investors, 727
N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ind.Ct. App. 2000) (concerning an action brought for violation of the Illinois
Health Care Consent Act among other causes of action).
410 See, e.g. Maresca v. Mancall, No. CIV.A. 01-5355, 2003 WL 21652170, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20,
2003). "[TWhe absence of a private right of action in a statutory scheme does not necessarily
preclude the statute's use as the basis of a claim of negligence per se." Id.; McCain v. Beverly
Health & Rehab. Serv., No. CIV.A. 02-657, 2002 WL 1565526, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2002).
"[Tihe lack of a private cause of action is not enough to preclude the use of the relevant policies
expressed in ...statutes and regulations." Id.
411 Cook Uithoven v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tenn. 1994).
407See

In order to establish negligence per se, it must be shown that the statute
violated was designed to impose a duty or prohibit an act for the benefit of a
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deemed to be negligence per se." 412
To "borrow" the statute to set the standard of care normally requires
establishing: (1) that the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute was designed
to protect; and (2) that the plaintiff's injuries were the type that the statute was designed
to prevent. 413 Patients have been able to satisfy both of these conditions. In related
actions against healthcare facilities, patients have proved negligence per se by offering
proof that the provider violated federal or state patient safety regulations.4 14 State health
care decisions acts are similarly appropriate bases for negligence per se actions. They
were specifically designed to protect patients against unwanted life-sustaining treatment.
8.

POLST Statutes

Just as healthcare decisions acts authorize statutory damages and causes of
action for violating advance directives, POLST statutes also authorize private rights of
action, though usually not as directly. North Carolina, for example, provides that a
clinician will not be subject to civil liability for failure to follow POLST only if "the
415
provider had no actual knowledge of [its] existence."
9.

Section 1983

More than 1,100 hospitals, 22% of all hospitals in the United States, are
operated by a municipal, state, or federal government. 416 Therefore, the administration
of unwanted treatment in such a facility constitutes state action. Accordingly, some
plaintiffs have brought actions under Section 1983417 or related statutes. 418 Section 1983

person or the public. It must also be established that the injured party was
within the class of persons that the statute was meant to protect.
Id. (citations omitted).
412 Id. at 937.
413 See Whaley v Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tenn. 2006).
414 See, e.g., French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tenn. 2011) (holding proof of
violations of the statute can be offered in support of negligence claims); McCain, No. CIV. A. 02657, 2002 WL 1565526 at *554 (finding statutes violated were held to be able to form the basis of
a claim for negligence per se); McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 631 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App.
2006) (noting violations of the state and federal statutes were sufficient to show negligence per
se).
41sN.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.17 (2011).
416 Taressa Fraze et al., Public Hospitals in the United States, AHRQ STATISTICAL BRIEF #95 (Sept.
2010), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb95.pdf.
417 See, e.g., Williams v. Wilzack, 573 A.2d 809 (Md. 1990) (describing psychiatric patient forced to
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provides that:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law .... 419
So, the plaintiffs must establish that, under the color of state law, the defendant:
(1) subjected them; (2) to a deprivation of rights; (3) guaranteed by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 420 The federally protected rights that plaintiffs have claimed
state actors deprived them of, by administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment, have
included: (1) the Constitutional right to privacy and self-determination; (2) procedural
due process; (3) free exercise of religion; (4) equal protection; (5) search and seizure; (6)
421
cruel and unusual punishment; and (7) the contract clause.
10. False ClaimsAct
The False Claims Act prohibits the submission of false or fraudulent claims to
the federal government. 422 When health care providers administer unwanted life-

take anti-psychotic medication); accord Granato v. City & Cry. of Denver, No. 11-CV-00304MSK-BNB, 2011 WL 3820730 (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2011); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139
(Minn. 1988); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986). Most of these cases concerning lifesustaining treatment have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Sama v. Hannigan, No. 10-40835 (5th Cir.
2012); Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F. Supp. 2d 436, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (dismissing
case where plaintiff failed to show defendants were state actors); Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp.,
676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987) (dismissing action on grounds that hospital and physicians
were private not government, actors); Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109 (9th Cit. 1983),
superseded by statute as stated in, Oliveira v. Bowen, 664 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1986). But see
McKenzie v. Doctor's Hosp. of Hollywood, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (suggesting
patient would have claim for violation of freedom of religion where clinicians acted pursuant to
state court order).
418 See, e.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
The plaintiff in this case argued that the medical center engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of
his Constitutional rights in violation of Section 1985(3) of the Federal Civil Rights Act. Id.
419 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
420 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled by Daniels v Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662
(1986).
421

See MEISEL AND CERMvINAR-A, supranote 25, at

422

31 U.S.C.

§ 3729 (2006).

5 11.09[A][1].
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sustaining treatment and then bill for it, they are likely in violation of the False Claims
423
Act for at least three separate reasons.
First, when they submit a claim for reimbursement, providers implicitly certify
that they have complied with the conditions of payment for Medicare, including all
applicable federal laws and regulations. 424 But such a certification will be false in the
case of unwanted treatment, because federal regulations require participating facilities to
42
allow patients to "refuse treatment."
Second, Medicare requires that reimbursed treatments be "medically
necessary. 42 6 When submitting a claim for reimbursement, the provider must "certify
that the services shown on this form were medically indicated and necessary for the
health of the patient ....*"427 "When a competent and informed patient or surrogate
expressly declines treatment, such treatment cannot be considered 'medically
428
necessary."'
Third, Medicare does not reimburse for "worthless services." 429 A worthiess
service "has no medical value" or is "so deficient that for all practical purposes it is the

4 3

A.B.A. CONM'N ON L. AND AGING, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
106B (Aug. 2011) (recommendations were eventually withdrawn).
424 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Rogan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 717-18
(N.D. Ill.
2006); U.S. ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485, 1487-88
(W.D. Okla. 1996).
425 42 C.F.R. § 482.13 (2012).
426 42 U.S.C. § 3120c-5(a)(1) (2006).
2 JEFFERY J. SNELL,

DELEGATES: RESOLUTION

427 CTRS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV, HEALTH INSURANCE CLAIM FoRM 1500 (1990),

available at
http://smchealth.org/sites/default/files/docs/BHS/Health-insurance-claim.pdf.pdf; see also 42
C.F.R. § 424.32(a)(1) (2012) (stating that such a certification is a prerequisite to Medicare
reimbursement).
428 SNELL, supra note 423, at 4.
429 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 702-03; U.S. v. Wachter, No. 4:05CR667SNL, 2006 WL 2460790, at *11
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2006). Stating an False Claims Act claim in indictment was legally sufficient
on worthless service theory, which "could include services that were so deficient that they were
of no utility to the [nursing home] resident, or were totally undesirable." Id.; see also U.S. v. NHC
Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (holding a jury could conclude
that defendant nursing home failed to "perform the minimum necessary care activities required
to promote the patient's quality of life"); U.S. v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43DCR, 2011 WL 6337455 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011) (similar); U.S. v. Momence Meadows Nursing
Ctr., No. 2:04-CV-02289 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2011) ($28 million verdict for worthless services and
false certification).
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equivalent of no performance at all." 430 Unwanted medical treatment is arguably a
"worthless service" because the patient or surrogate has already determined that it is "of
no medical value" to the patient.
431
A critically important part of the False Claims Act is its qui tam provision.
This provision is designed to encourage citizens with knowledge of fraud against the
government to come forward by authorizing them to file a civil suit in the name of the
government, and by rewarding them with a percentage of the recovery. Some
organizations are educating, encouraging, and empowering individuals to fight
432
healthcare fraud related to unwanted life-sustaining treatment.

11. Other Costs ofLiabiliy
As demonstrated in the last ten subsections, plaintiffs have been increasingly
able to establish civil liability under tort, contract, and statutory causes of action.
Moreover, they have been able to obtain not only compensatory damages but they have
been able to impose three other types of financial penalties: (1) attorney's fees; 433 (2)

punitive damages; 434 and nonpayment for rendered medical services. 435 Many health

430

Mikes, 274 F.3d at 702.

431

31 U.S.C. § 3130(b)-(d).

Compassion & Choices, Unwanted Medical Treatment: Toolkit for Compassion & Choices Advocates
(Feb. 27, 2013), http://community.compassionandchoices.org/document.doc?id=1283; Do No

432

Harm: When Healthcare Goes too Far,COMPASSION & CHOICES MAG. (Spring 2013), at 12-18.
CHOOSING WISELY, Five Things PhysiciansandPatientsShouldQuestion (2012),

http://www.choosingwisely.org/doctor-patient-lists/; American College of Physicians, High
Value Care (2013), http://hvc.acponline.org.
433See Gray v. Romeo, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1989) (ordering defendants to pay plaintiff
$38,495.95 in attorney fees); McMahon v. Lopez, 245 Cal. Rptr. 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Bouvia
v.County of LA, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (remanding for fees); In re Carothers,
No. 89PR66 (Mesa Cty. Dist. Ct. Feb. 15, 1989); Hoffmeister v. Coler, 544 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989).
434See, e.g., Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1055. Punitive or exemplary damages are appropriate when the
clinician's conduct is willful or malicious. See generally DOBBS, supra note 288, 5 381, at 1062; see,
e.g., id.at 648-49 ("Courts have considered the negligence of a physician or surgeon to be so
obvious or gross that a jury should be allowed to find negligence ...because gross and obvious
negligence is an independent exception"); Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging Ltd., 70 P.3d 435
(Ariz. 2003) (finding a patient who forbids all sedatives except Demerol is not consenting to
some other sedative); Rains v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
435Marshall Kapp, Enforing Patient Preferences: Linking Paymentfor Medical Care to Informed Consent,
261 JAMA 1935, 1936 (1989) ("In the realm of reimbursement ... medical services should be
considered as any other economic commodity - to be paid for only when voluntarily, knowingly,
and competently purchased."); Gasner, supra note 12, at 514 ("Permitting payment for unwanted
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care decisions acts authorize attorney's fees for prevailing parties. 436 Intentional torts
like battery and IIED usually also support punitive damages. 43 And providers are often
438
unable to get reimbursed for administering unwanted treatment.
B. Mitigation of Legal Obstacles
Not only have plaintiffs been able to establish the civil liability of clinicians
administering unwanted life-sustaining treatment, but also the five "perceived" obstacles
to establishing such liability are not nearly as significant as they are salient. 439 First, while
the "wrongful living" cause of action has been widely rejected, it is superfluous and
unnecessary. Second, while private claims under the PSDA have been rejected, they too
are unnecessary, given alternate common law and statutory remedies. Third, while the
emergency situation implies an exception to the consent requirement, that exception is
conditional and limited. Fourth, safe harbor immunity is tightly circumscribed. Fifth,
conscience clause immunity is similarly confined.
1. A "Wrongful Living" Cause ofAction is Unnecessary.
The rejection of a "wrongful living" cause of action has been described as a
major obstacle to clinician accountability. 440 But its non-recognition is actually largely
treatment provides a serious disincentive to honor patient choice.'); Pedrick, supra note 227, at
399 (arguing for "fiscal persuasion" to get providers to honor instructions).
436

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. § 5-810(b).
L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES ch. 9 (6th ed. LexisNexis 2010).

437LINDA

See, e.g., Rockville Gen. Hosp. v. Wirzulis, No. CV-000072868 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 28,
2003) (noting patient not obligated to pay for the cost of an intensive care room); Grace Plaza of
Great Neck v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that patients who do not
consent are not liable for any treatment provided in contravention of their wishes but further
holding family could not refuse to pay for care rendered while a court determined if the patient
had actually refused the treatment); Gragg v. Calenda, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998).
But see, e.g., First Healthcare Corp. v. Rettinger, 467 S.E.2d 243, 244 (N.C. 1996) (allowing
payment because statutory requirements had not been satisfied); Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d
1047, 1053-55 (Ohio App. Ct. 1984); Novak v. Cobb Cty. Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 74 F.3d
1173, 1176-77 (11th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (describing how a hospital got court order to perform
treatment). Cf.Lawson v. Fleming, No. 10-CV-00900-BNB (D. Colo.June 10, 2010) (patient
sued when providers attempted to collect for "unwanted and unauthorized medical treatment").
439 See sitora Section IV.C.
440See, e.g., Richard P. Dooling, Damage Actionsfor NonconsensualLife-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 30
ST. LouIs U. L.J. 895 (1986); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die. The
Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986); Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Violation of an
Individual's Right to Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355
(1996); William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongul Living": Resuscitation as Tortious Interference
438
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irrelevant. First, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, there are ample alternative
theories of liability. There is no need for a new and separate "wrongful living" cause of
action. So, in Cronin v. Jamaica Hotpital Medical Center, the parties reached a settlement,
even though the court affirmed summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff was asserting a claim for "wrongful living" and that no such
cause of action could be maintained. 441
Second, even to the extent that "wrongful living" is considered just a damages
concept, 44 2 the impact of its rejection is limited. Even if a plaintiff cannot recover for
the prolongation of life itself, she can still recover for pain and suffering from the
treatment itself and for the affront to her autonomy. 443 In other words, she does not
claim damages for the pain and suffering caused by being alive, but rather for the pain
and suffering caused by being treated against her beliefs and values. 444
Furthermore, it is likely that today's courts would recognize a wrongful living
cause of action. The earlier rejections were due to courts' reluctance to award damages
where the withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment was not yet well-established. 445 But
end-of-life jurisprudence has evolved significantly in that regard.

with a Patient'sRight to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 253 (1992); Steven L. Addlestone,
Note, Liabiliofor Improper Maintenance of Life Support: Balancing Patient and Physician Autonomy, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1255 (1993).
441Cronin

v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr, 60 A.D.3d 803, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Lisa Comeau,
Attorney, Appellate Counsel, Remarks at the Freedom of Choice at the End of Life Symposium (Nov. 16,
2012), available at http://www.nyls.edu/centers/harlan-scholar-centers/justice-action-center/
annualconferences/end of life.
442 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, at 5 11.03[B][4][b]; Lynch et al., supra note 37, at
141-42.
443See DOBBS, supra note 288, §42, at 79 (noting that "the invasion of plaintiff's rights is regarded
as a harm in itself and subject to an award of damages"); Self v. Milyard, No. 11-CV-00813-RBJCBS, 2012 WL 1602104 (D. Colo. May 7, 2012) (suing for pain and discomfort while going
through an extubation process contrary to a DNR order); Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678
(N.J. Super. A.D. 2007). However, courts are less willing to permit recovery for living expenses.
Cf Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 411-14 (R.I. 1997).
444See Sabine Michalowski, Trial andError at the End of Life-No Harm Done?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUDIES 257, 268, 270 (2007).
445
See, e.g., DAVID ORENTLICHER

ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW

298-99 (2d ed.

2008); Battling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. App. 1986). The court
in Bartling affirmed the dismissal of claims for battery, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and of violations of constitutional and civil rights; because state
of the law was such that providers' actions did not rise to the level of "conscious" disregard of
patient's rights. Id. at 364.
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The concept of "wrongful life" was deemed problematic, because "life" was
presumed to be a positive thing. But the whole point for some seriously ill patients is
that they do not see their own lives in that way. 446 For these patients, the unwanted
administration of life-sustaining treatment is tantamount to medical torture. Courts
have been increasingly recognizing that many individuals find themselves in a condition
they find abhorrent. For them, even life-saving medical attention is harmful. 44 7 Even
the right-to-die cases of the 1980s and 1990s "evidence some concession by courts that
life may not always be preferable to nonexistence." 448 With the development of not just
right-to-die, but also aid-in-dying jurisprudence, that proposition now is far more
settled. 449
2.

PrivateClaims under the PSDA are Unnecessary

Like the rejection of a "wrongful living" cause of action, the rejection of a cause
of action under the PSDA may send a symbolic message that administering unwanted
life-sustaining treatment is not a legal wrong. But the availability of a remedy under this
statute, like the availability of a "wrongful living" cause of action is actually irrelevant.
The PSDA only enforced underlying substantive rights under state law. Since state law
provides its own remedies and enforcement mechanisms, a cause of action under the
PSDA is unnecessary.
3.

The Emergency Exception is limited

Some courts have permitted a rather expansive use of the emergency exception
to find implied consent for the administration of life-sustaining treatment even when
actual consent was specifically denied. 450 But this hardly means that the emergency
exception is tantamount to a "blank check" for clinicians to administer whatever
treatment they want, whenever they deem it appropriate, notwithstanding the absence of
patient or surrogate consent.
See Pope & Anderson, supra note 20, at 368-75.
Cal. Rptr. at 362 (quoting the patient's description of "artificial existence" as
"unbearable, degrading and dehumanizing"). "Certainly life is valuable;" however, for those with
terminal illnesses, "the preference ...may be to hasten death so that death can be on an
at 375.
individual's terms." Id.
448Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U.
BALT. L. REV. 185, 223 (1993); see also Strasser, supra note 243, at 1038-41; Peters, supra note 11, at
691.
449See, e.g., Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009); Carter v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2012 BCSC 886.
450 See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text.
446

447Bartling, 229
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The emergency exception requires that under the circumstances a reasonable
person would consent, and the probabilities are that the patient would consent. 451 The
physician must have "no reason to think the plaintiff would refuse consent. ' 45 2 This
requirement is not satisfied, if the clinician knows that the patient either actually rejected
or would reject the treatment.
For example, an Illinois appellate court recently held that the existence of
medical emergency was irrelevant where patient had "clearly refused [a particular
treatment] at an earlier time." 45 3 And in Malette v. Shulman, the court held that the
emergency exception would have authorized the physician to administer blood
45 4
transfusions only had there been "no Jehovah's Witness card."
Simply put, the emergency exception is inapplicable in the situation in which the
patient has expressly refused treatment. 455 "If the patient, while competent, has reliably
expressed her opposition to a particular medical procedure, her wishes are not to be
overridden when she falls unconscious and death is imminent." 45 6 Otherwise, "[c]arried
to its extreme ... the doctrine of implied consent could effectively nullify those privacy
rights" recognized in statutory and common law. 45 7
4.

Safe HarborImmuniy is i'mited

Many states grant legal immunity to health care providers who refuse to comply
with patients' treatment requests. 458 But the conferral of this immunity is almost always
conditional. 459 In California, for example, a health care provider that declines to comply
with an individual health care instruction or health care decision must "make all
451
452

PROSSER, supra note 349, at 5 18, at 117.
DOBBS, supra note 288, § 106, at 247; id. ("The emergency rule is not intended to permit

providers to overcome or avoid confronting the patient's wishes").
453 Sekerez v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 954 N.E.2d 383, 396 (IIl. App. 2011).
454 Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R. 4th 321 (Ont. C.A. 1990).
455 Curtis v. Jaskey, 759 N.E.2d 962, 966-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d
681, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984) ("where the parties contract expressly with regard to a particular procedure, an
implied agreement cannot thereafter arise when the express agreement directly controverts the
inclusion of any such implication.'); Hegland, supra note 170, at 865 ("This rationale, however,
cannot be applied where it is clear that the patient's true desire is to refuse consent").
456 DOBBS, supra note 288, 5 106, at 247.
457 Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
458 See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
459 See Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Fuil-y Statutes: No Safe Harborto Unilaterall Refuse Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REv. 1, 56-58 (2007).
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reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer of the patient to another health care provider
or institution that is willing to comply with the instruction or decision;" and, the
provider must "provide continuing care to the patient until a transfer can be
460
accomplished or until it appears that a transfer cannot be accomplished."
In Cardoza v. USC University Hospital, the California Court of Appeal held that
there are definite limits to the scope of safe harbor immunity. 461 Health care providers
complied with decisions of an appointed health care agent, a son of the patient, to
continue aggressive interventions for his mother. 462 But the agent's sister, and patient's
daughter, brought a lawsuit alleging that providers failed to comply with her mother's
advance directive. 463 Since the surrogate had no authority to contravene instructions
and preferences memorialized in the advance directive, the court held that the hospital
could not have complied with the surrogate's decisions "in good faith." 464 Therefore,
4 65
the court held that the hospital was not entitled to immunity.
Similarly, in Malette v. Shulman, the patient had a Jehovah's Witness card that said
"No Blood Transfusion." 466 The physician was "not satisfied" that the card expressed
the patient's current instructions. 467 He did not know:
whether she might have changed her religious beliefs before the
accident; whether the card may have been signed because of family or
peer pressure; whether at the time she signed the card she was fully
informed of the risks of refusal of blood transfusions; or whether, if
468
conscious, she might have changed her mind.
But these were rather abstract concerns. The physician had no specific grounds
469
to doubt that the card "constituted a valid statement of the patient's wishes."
Accordingly, the court held that the card "had the effect of validly restricting the
470
treatment that could be provided."

§§ 4736, 4740(d) (West 2009).

460

CAL. PROB. CODE

461

464

Cardoza v. USC Univ. Hosp., No. B195092, 2008 WL 3413312, *14-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *5.

465

Id

462
463

466
467
468
469
470

Malette v. Shulman, 72 O.R.2d 417 (Ont. Ct. App.1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529, 533-34 (S.C. 2002). This case holds that

JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW

2013

5.

Conscience Clausesare Limited

Just as the scope of safe harbor immunity for professionally grounded refusals is
limited, so is the scope of immunity for personal, conscience-based objections. 4 1 For
example, in Folley v. United Surgical Partners,472 a medical facility required all its patients to
sign a consent form acknowledging that the center will "not honor a request for 'Do
Not Resuscitate' status and/or Advance Directives or Living Wills." The surgery center
claimed that its refusal to honor advance directives was allowable under the law's
"reason of conscience" exemption. 473
But United Surgical Partners never produced any policy or mission statement
demonstrating that a commitment to religious ideals informed their refusal to honor
living wills. 474 Indeed, it was odd that they rejected all advance directives, even those
that would require doctors to try to prolong life. 475 Furthermore, the surgery center
failed to make efforts to transfer its patients to another facility willing to comply with
their advance directives. 476 The ACLU sued the facility for violating the conditions of
New Mexico Health Care's conscience safe harbor. 477 Recognizing that it lacked
protection, United Surgical Partners quickly changed its policy.478
Another example of the limitations and qualifications typical of conscience
clauses is Iowa's 2012 POLST statute, which provides that a health care provider
"unwilling to comply with an executed POST form based on policy, religious beliefs, or
moral convictions" shall nevertheless "take all reasonable steps to transfer the patient to
47 9
another health care provider, hospital, or health care facility."
physician should have neither sought, nor accepted, consent from the patient's mother where the
patient's wishes were clear. Id.
471
472

Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, supra note 206, at 163.
Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Folley v. United Surgical Partners et al., (2005), available at

http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF2E79.pdf.
473Id.
474Id.

475Press Release, American Civil Liberties

Union, ACLU of New Mexico Defends Patient's End-

of-Life Wishes (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/l5343prs20050609.html.
476

Id.

477N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 24-7A-7E (1997) (current version at 5 24-7A-7E (2009)).

Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of New Mexico Defends Patient's Endof-Life Wishes (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/15343prs20050609.html.
478

479 IOWA CODE ANN.

§

144D.3(5) (2012); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.

statute permits a provider to:

§ 39-4513(2)

(2012). This
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Administrative Sanctions

C.

While litigation is one form of health care regulation, it is complemented by
480

Most relevant here are: (1)
481
inspections and sanctions.
others.

medical board discipline; and (2) facility

MedicalBoardDiscipline

1.

Every state has a state medical board charged with assuring that the physicians
practicing within the state have the requisite qualifications and skills to safely provide
health care services to the public. 482 Medical boards do this by performing three core
functions.

First, they determine which physicians meet the standards of the state to
Second, they establish standards for appropriate physician

legally practice medicine.
practice.

Third, medical boards remove incompetent and otherwise unfit physicians.

The first two functions pertain to gatekeeping. In this section, I will focus on the third
function: discipline.
State health care decisions acts specifically authorize medical board discipline
for failing to honor patient treatment choices.
health

For example, New Jersey provides: "A

care professional who intentionally fails to act in accordance with the
483
of this act is subject to discipline for professional misconduct."

requirements

withdraw without incurring any civil or criminal liability provided the physician
or other health care provider, before withdrawal of his or her participation,
makes a good faith effort to assist the person in obtaining the services of
another physician or other health care provider who is willing to provide care
for the person in accordance with the person's expressed or documented
wishes.
Id.
Thaddeus M. Pope, The Topography and Geography of U.S. Health Care Regulation, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 427, 427-31 (2010) (examining the structure, coverage, supplements, underlying themes,
and limitations of health care regulation in America).
481 Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996) (recognizing
availability of "licensing sanctions"); Michalowski, supra note 444, at 280. This article notes that
"[ljiability in tort is not the only way in which physicians can be encouraged to respect advance
directives, as there is also the possibility of disciplinary sanctions in case of a violation of the
patient's declared wishes." Id.
482 See generally James N. Thompson & Lisa A. Robin, State Medical Boards: Challengesfor Regulation
andQuality Enhancementof MedicalCare, 33J. LEGAL MED. 93, 96 (2012).
483 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26-2H-78(a); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 ("A failure by a physician
to effectuate the declaration of a terminal patient constitutes unprofessional conduct if the

480
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Similarly, under New Jersey's new POLST statute: "A health care professional who
intentionally fails to act in accordance with the requirements of this act is subject to
484
discipline for professional misconduct."
And those are not the only sources of professional license-based obligations to
respect patient treatment refusals. State medical license codes often broadly reference
patient autonomy rights. For example, the New Mexico medical code expressly
48 5
incorporates the American Medical Association ("AMA") Code of Medical Ethics.
This means that a breach of the AMA Code can constitute "unprofessional conduct"
and grounds for discipline, including the denial, suspension or revocation of or the
48 6
imposition of restrictions or conditions on a license.
The AMA Code "requires that physicians respect the decision to forego lifesustaining treatment . . . not limited to, mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis,
chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and hydration." 48 7 It further provides:
"advance directives stating patients' refusals of CPR should be honored whether patients
are in or out of hospital. When patients refuse CPR, physicians should not permit their
488
personal value judgments to obstruct implementation of the refusals.
One notable enforcement action was brought against New York physician
Mahmood Yoonessi, the clinician with whom story this article began. 489 Recall that Dr.
Yoonessi, a specialist in gynecologic oncology, 490 performed an "extensive surgical
procedure" on a 67-year-old patient with advanced ovarian cancer. 491 Unfortunately, the
patient developed problems post-operatively necessitating blood transfusions, and lost
decision-making capacity, at which point the patient's family determined that "enough
was enough. ' 492 So, they authorized the entry of a DNR order and directed that the
physician fails or refuses to make reasonable efforts to effect the transfer of the patient to
another physician who will effectuate the declaration").
I was retained as an expert witness by a New Mexico
484 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-139(a).
hospital on this point. See Bhandari v. VHA Southwest Comm. Health Corp., No. 1:09-CV00932-JB-GBW (D.N.M. 2010) (Deposition).
485 N.M.A.C. § 16.10.8.9(A) ("The board adopts the ethical standards set forth in the latest
published version of the 'code of medical ethics current opinions with annotations of the Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association'...
486 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6B-9(B)(5).
487

AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Opinion 2.20.

488

491

Id. at Opinion 2.22.
See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
In re Yoonessi, No. BPMC 02-188, 2002 WL 33840948 (N.Y.B.P.M.C. June 5, 2002).
Id. at "15.

492

Id. at *16.

489
490
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493
patient receive no further transfusions.

But Dr. Yoonessi "wanted to further aggressively treat the patient." 494 He said,
"I don't care what the family wants" and ordered blood anyway. 495 Dr. Yoonessi told
the family that "they were being like Jack Kevorkian, that if this was his mother he
wouldn't allow this to happen, and that they were playing God by not allowing their
mother to have further treatment."496
The New York Board of Professional Medical Conduct found that Dr.
Yoonessi's "inflammatory statements" were "most inappropriate" and a "severe
deviation from acceptable standards of care." 497 The Board concluded that this conduct
4
constituted "gross negligence and moral unfitness. 98
The Board also reviewed Dr. Yoonessi's conduct with respect to two other
patients on whom he attempted resuscitation despite their DNR status and found this
was "an assault" and constituted "gross negligence and lack of proper consent. 499 It
held: "Once the patient signs the DNR consent, the physician is obliged to follow the
patient's request. 500° "No physician has the right to cancel a DNR without patient
50
consent." 1
The Board concluded that Dr. Yoonessi "totally ignored his responsibility.., to
review the DNR order for his patient.. . . Assaulting a patient is reckless disregard for
the patient's rights. 502 The Board further concluded that countermanding a DNR order
requested by the patient is a "very significant deviation" that constitutes "gross
50 3
negligence, lack of proper consent, and moral unfitness.
The case against Dr. Yoonessi also included other violations. But the Board
was especially concerned with his violation of "the principle of patient control and

493 Id.

Id.
495 Id. at
494

496

497
498

499
500

501
502

503

*18.

Yoonessi, 2002 WL 33840948 at *16 (N.Y.B.P.M.C. June 5, 2002).
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id. at *22-23.
Id. at *32.
Id.
Yoonessi, 2002 WL 33840948 at *23-24.
Id. at *32.
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autonomy."50 4 The Board observed: "Perhaps the most egregious violation is [Dr.
Yoonessi's] disregard of the wishes of the patient or their duly authorized surrogates
concerning end of life decisions."5 0s Accordingly, the Board revoked Dr. Yoonessi's
50 6
license to practice medicine.
And Dr. Yoonessi's legal troubles did not end there. A few weeks after the
New York Board revoked Dr. Yoonessi's license to practice in New York, the Medical
Board of California revoked his California license.507 The California Board, persuaded
by the New York Board's finding that Dr. Yoonessi was "beyond rehabilitation,"
concluded that he was not "safe to practice medicine in California."5 08 Six years later, in
2008, the California Board denied Dr. Yoonessi's petition for reinstatement.50 9
The case against Dr. Yoonessi is not unique. State medical boards have been
Specifically, other
more aggressively investigating and disciplining physicians.510
physicians have similarly been disciplined by state medical boards for administering
treatment without consent.51' Even if the board ultimately imposes no sanctions,
5 12
physicians can be severely penalized simply as a consequence of the investigation.
The collateral damages can be enormous.
For example, Albert Dworkin was eventually exonerated by the Delaware

5C4Id. at
505
506
507
508
509
510
511

*38.

Id
Id. at *40-41.
In re Yoonessi, No. 16-2001-128690 (Med. Bd. Cal. Apr. 30, 2003).
Id.
In re Yoonessi, No. 20-2006-179832 (Med. Bd. Cal. Sept. 10, 2008).
Christine S. Moyer, Doctor Discipline by States MedicalBoards,AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010.
See, e.g., Abofreka v. VA Bd. Of Med., No. 2793-06-4, 2007 WL 2301727, at *1, *9 (Va. Ct.

App. 2007) (affirming suspended medical license for failure to obtain patient's informed consent
for anesthesia); In re Kaphan, No. BPMC 98-142, 1998 WL 35078544 (N.Y. Bd. Prof'l. Med.
Conduct June 30, 1998) (suspending medical license after finding physician performed a
procedure on Patient B without consent); In re Burman, No. BPMC 00-221, 2000 WL 35364277
(N.Y. Bd. Prof'l. Med. Conduct July 30, 2000) (finding physician failed to obtain Patient A's
informed consent to apply clamps to fallopian tubes); ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN
HEALTH CARE LAW 412-14 (9th ed. 2006) (collecting cases). It is difficult to find these cases.
State medical boards organize their publicly available information only by clinician name and
license number, so that patients can "check out" their doctor. Cf.Thaddeus M. Pope, Involuntag
Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR 229, 231 n.8 (2008) (bemoaning the lack of a "systematic way to locate
unreported cases").
512 See discussion infra Section V.E., "Other Liability Costs."
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Medical Board.5 13 But during the pendency of proceedings, Dr. Dworkin's hospital
cancelled all his admitting and treating privileges. 5 14 Dr. Dworkin was dropped from
almost all his patients' insurance programs.515 And his malpractice carrier cancelled his
insurance policy and refused to provide legal assistance or cover legal costs. 516 In the
end, Dr. Dworkin lost his office and his office staff, and he was shunned by colleagues
and former acquaintances. 51 And he was inundated with requests from patients to
518
transfer records.
2.

Health CareFaciliy Inspections

Just as individual clinicians have duties to honor patient treatment refusals, most
health care facilities also have statutory and regulatory duties to honor advance directives
and refusal of treatment. Failure to comply with these duties can lead to fines and other
sanctions.
For example, New Jersey provides: "A health care institution that intentionally
fails to act in accordance with the requirements of this act shall be subject to a fine of
not more than $1,000 for each offense."5 19 Similarly, under New Jersey's new POLST
law, "A health care institution that intentionally fails to act in accordance with the
requirements of this act shall be liable to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each
520
offense."
Furthermore, while state governments oversee the licensing of nursing homes,
the federal government also has a significant role, because substantial Medicare and
Medicaid dollars are used to cover nursing home care and services for the elderly and

513Steven

Ertelt, DelawareAbortion Doc Wins Hearing, Reg Bill Moves Ahead, LIFENEWS.COM (Apr.
13, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/04/13/delaware-abortion-doc-winshearing-reg-bill-moves-ahead/.
Dworkin was not charged with administering unwanted
treatment; however, he was charged with assisting a Pennsylvania doctor with running a filthy,
dangerous abortion center. Id. The center was responsible for deaths and injuries to women
resulting from botched abortions. Id.
514Albert Dworkin, You Could Be Next, 83 DEL. MED. J. 273, 274 (2011), available at
http://www.medsocdel.org/Portals/1 /DMJ/9-2011 September.pdf.
515 Id. The insurance companies that dropped Dr. Dworkin included BCBS, Medicare, Medicaid,
Aetna, Delaware Physicians Care, Multiplan, UnitedHealthcare, and Devon. Id.
516 Id.
517Id.
518 Id.
519
520

N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 26:2H-78(b) (West 2007).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 26:2H-139(b) (West Supp. 2012).
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disabled.5 21 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") contract with states
to monitor those nursing homes that want to be eligible to provide care to Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries. 5 2 2 So the state, usually through its health department or
department of human services, has the responsibility for certifying a facility's compliance
or noncompliance with quality and performance standards in Medicare and Medicaid
regulations.523
These types of obligations have been aggressively enforced.5 24 For example, the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services Office of Inspector General ("OIG")
is Kentucky's regulatory agency for licensing all long-term care facilities. 5 25 To monitor
and enforce the rights of residents in Kentucky long-term care facilities, the OIG
conducts unannounced inspections.5 26 One of the rights that the OIG enforces is the
right to refuse medical treatment.5 27 In March 2008, the OIG issued a citation to Green
Meadows Health Care for trying to revive a resident who had signed a DNR order.528
And in March 2009, it cited Louisville's Jefferson Manor after staff resuscitated 95-year5 29
old Eva Karem despite a DNR order.

Nursing Homes, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/nursing/aboutinspections.asp
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Other states have similarly sanctioned facilities for resuscitating residents
contrary to their instructions.5 30 For example, in June 2012, a Florida facility was cited
for initiating CPR on a resident "who had stated on admission that he did not want to
be resuscitated."

531

Furthermore, the states have been sanctioning facilities not only for
inappropriate resuscitation, but also for improperly or inadequately recording resident
preferences not to be resuscitated.5 32 For example, one facility "failed to place the

530
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signed DNRs in the patient's records" placing them "at risk for their [DNR] wishes not
being followed." 33 Another facility lacked "necessary policies and procedures for
5 34
assuring that residents' advance directives would be honored."
3.

Medicare Conditions of Partidpation

Not only have the states been aggressively enforcing patient rights protections,
but those regulations have themselves recently been strengthened. 535 For example,
federal regulations have long provided that a nursing home resident "has the right to
But in late 2012, CMS strengthened the implementation of
*..."536
refuse treatment .
this standard by better clarifying that "the resident may not be treated against his/her
wishes."5

37

Specifically, CMS issued detailed guidance for surveyors, helping them

5 38
identify noncompliant practices, policies, and procedures.

These surveyors conduct observations, interviews, and record reviews to assess
compliance at two levels.5 39 First, they determine whether "orders are consistent with

nursinghomecompare/SurveyReportDetail.aspx?ID=676157&SURVEYDATE=October/o201
%202012.
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(providing incentive payments by including the charting of advance directives as one "meaningful
use" outcome).
536 42 C.F.R. 5 483.10(b)(4) (2012).
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the resident's documented choices and goals. '5 40 Second, they determine whether "any
treatment or interventions have been ordered... that are inconsistent with the resident's
5 41
documented acceptance or refusal of treatment or with an existing advance directive."
In short, new CMS guidance directs surveyors to ensure (1) that orders match wishes
and (2) that treatment matches orders.
Furthermore, the new guidance not only strengthens the rigor of the inspection
process relative to life-sustaining treatment, but it also increases the penalties for
noncompliance. The new guidance provides that "failure to obtain and implement
medical orders related to life-sustaining treatments" is the highest level deficiency:
5 42
"Level 4: Immediate Jeopardy to Resident Health or Safety."
D. Criminal Sanctions
Most states impose criminal sanctions to protect the integrity of advance
directives. But criminal prohibitions typically do not directly address compliance by
health care providers. Instead, these statutes prohibit the nonconsensual concealment,
defacement, modification, and falsification of an advance directive.5 43 They also
prohibit coercing or fraudulently inducing the execution of an advance directive. 544
But there has been growing recognition that clinician noncompliance itself
sometimes warrants criminal sanctions. For example, the Montana Supreme Court
recently observed that that state's "legislature criminalized the failure to follow a
patient's end-of-life instructions." 545 A Montana physician "who willfully fails to record
the determination of terminal condition or the terms of a declaration" is punishable by a
546
maximum $500 fine, a maximum one year in jail, or both.
This is consistent with a broader trend toward greater use of the criminal law to
address clinician noncompliance with governing rules and standards. 547 This is especially
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
542 Id. at 20.
143 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20 -17-209 (2005); MONT. CODE ANN.
STAT. ANN. § 26-2H-78(c) (2007).
540
541
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Id.
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Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1219 (Mont. 2009).

§ 50 -9-105 (2011); N.J.

546 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(2) (2011).
547 See genraly ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HEALTH CARE LAw 690-91 (9th ed. 2006);

James A. Filkins, With No Evil Intent: The CriminalProsecution of Physiciansfor MedicalNegligence, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 467 (2001); Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
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true with respect to Medicare fraud and abuse. 548 For example, billing for unwanted
treatment can constitute not only a civil, but also a criminal false claim, because it is
549
medically unnecessary.
E. Other Liability Costs
Just as clinicians may suffer financial penalties related to, though distinct from,
civil liability, clinicians may also suffer financial penalties separate and independent from
administrative sanctions. Most notably, the process of responding to a regulatory
investigation can easily reach $10,000.550 Plus, there are other costs of emotional
distress, lost time, and reputation.551
VI. Conclusion
The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been established for decades.
But as with many principles in bioethics, there remains a wide chasm between legal and
ethical principles, on the one hand, and the reality of clinical practice, on the other hand.
Significant numbers of patients receive treatment inconsistent with their wishes and
instructions.5 5 2 And this materially contributes to the nearly $700 billion wasted in U.S.
553
health care annually.
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Commentators are correct that "unless health care providers . . . face
consequences for ignoring or failing to follow a patient's directives, the public policy
favoring these directives stands to be undermined."5 5 4 After all, providers are rational.
Only when "injuring patients becomes more expensive than not injuring them, [will]
'555
providers will stop injuring patients.
Clinicians' behavior is guided: (1)by what they think the law is; (2) by what they
think the chances of enforcement are; and (3) by what they think the sanctions are. Less
influential is: (a) what the law actually is; (b) what the chances of enforcement actually
are; and (c) what the sanctions actually are. In contrast to other commentators, I have
aimed to establish that the prospect for enforcement and consequences is not nearly as
dismal as often depicted. Sanctions are more severe and more frequent than is
commonly thought. This is an important starting point for changing clinician
perceptions, and, consequently, clinician behavior.

"Overtreatment also includes intensive care at the end of a person's life when alternative care
would have been preferred by the patient and family ...... Id. The Institute of Medicine
estimates that $210 billion of $765 billion in waste is due to "unnecessary services." Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies, The Cost of Healthcare- How Much is Waste?, THE
HEALTHCARE
IMPERATIVE
(Dec.
5,
2011,
9:08
AM),
available
at
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011 /The-Healthcare-Imperative-Lowering-Costs-andImproving-Outcomes.aspx; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACAD., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST:
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554 Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. March 15, 1995).
555 Hyman & Silver, supra note 383, at 1131.

